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ABSTRACT 
Jesse Michael Hinde: Examining the Impacts of Health Insurance Costs and Health Reform on 
Private Insurance Coverage, Employment, and Wages 
(Under the guidance of Christine Piette Durrance) 
This dissertation is focused on private health insurance coverage, health reform and labor 
market outcomes. Using novel and rigorous empirical strategies, the first two essays estimate the 
impact of health insurance tax credits adopted during Massachusetts’s 2006 health reform and as 
a part of the Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2014 on non-group private health insurance 
coverage. In Massachusetts, I find a large response on the margin for the tax credits. For the 
ACA, I document robust, positive effects on private coverage at the lowest eligibility threshold 
and weak evidence of effects at higher thresholds. Separating these effects from other important 
ACA policies, such as Medicaid expansion or the individual mandate, is vital to future efforts to 
modify and sustain the progress made by the ACA. 
The third essay addresses a significant gap in the literature, examining how employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI) affects the earnings distribution. I examine the role of sample 
selection and selection bias as an explanation for the inconsistent findings in the literature. Using 
quantile regression, I show that that cost-shifting due to compensating wage differentials occurs 
and that cost-shifting can be offset for higher earnings due to higher marginal tax rates, 
producing net-positive effects. Together, my dissertation indicates that reducing reliance on ESI 
may have beneficial effects on earnings for low- and middle-income individuals and that health 
insurance tax credits provide an appealing, alternative coverage option. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Recent health reform policies in the United States (US) focus on increasing access to, 
improving the quality of, and reducing the cost of medical care. Access, quality and cost are in 
many ways governed by health insurance. Given rising medical costs, health insurance not only 
provides indemnity against unexpected health shocks but affordable access to basic and routine 
medical services. Health insurance in the US is predominately provided through employment, 
with more than 60% of the population covered by an employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) 
plan (DeNavas et al. 2009). ESI is appealing in large part because it offers a significant price 
reduction relative to private, non-group market prices. Individuals without access to ESI must 
rely on a volatile and expensive non-group market, obtain coverage through a public program if 
eligible, or be uninsured. Thus, although the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 
(ACA) requires that employers offer health insurance, a major push of the ACA is to increase the 
availability and affordability of insurance through public insurance coverage expansions and 
through subsidy programs for private non-group insurance available on online marketplaces.  
In 2014, the ACA implemented premium tax credits to individuals with incomes below 
400% of the federal poverty level (FPL) and cost-sharing subsidies to individuals below 250% 
FPL. Subsidized plans were available on state or federal health insurance (HI) exchanges, i.e., 
online marketplaces. Nearly 8 million people signed up for coverage in 2014 and more than 80% 
of individuals who enrolled in the exchanges received either tax credits or cost-sharing subsidies. 
The average tax credit received was approximately $3,000 ($243/month) (ASPE 2014). The cost-
sharing subsidies reduced co-insurance, deductibles, and out-of-pocket maximums. These two 
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subsidies represent the broadest offering of subsidies for non-group health insurance. The ACA 
subsidies build on the subsidy plan first offered in Massachusetts as part of an earlier health 
reform in 2006. 
There is limited evidence of the effectiveness of insurance subsidies for private, non-
group health insurance. Existing subsidies are largely built into the tax system, providing general 
deductions for health care costs above 7.5% of adjusted gross income or more specific 
deductions (e.g., the self-employed). Two recent studies focused on subsidies available to the 
self-employed (tax-based) and those recently unemployed (not tax-based) and have found 
modest, positive effects on insurance coverage (Heim & Lurie 2009, Moriya & Simon 2016). 
In the context of the ACA, while eligible individuals receive a substantial subsidy, the 
monthly premiums may still be higher than individuals are willing to pay. Additionally, the 
search costs of navigating the exchanges may provide additional disincentive. By examining the 
effectiveness of the tax credits and cost-sharing combined and separately, this dissertation 
provides evidence on how consumers respond to differing levels of subsidies and how the 
incentives could be altered to increase participation. Two chapters in this dissertation examine 
the Massachusetts and broader ACA subsidy schemes.   
A secondary line of inquiry in my dissertation focuses on the tradeoff between increasing 
ESI premiums and wages. As noted, ESI is the predominate form of health insurance in the US 
and offers a substantial price reduction relative to the individual market. Because insurance is 
largely linked to employment, microeconomic theory implies an unambiguous negative effect on 
earnings and an uncertain effect on employment levels. The ACA was politically framed as a 
threat to employment and wages but initial evidence suggests that the impacts on employment 
are minimal. The impact on earnings has not yet been studied.   
3 
More broadly, while the hypothetical tradeoff between ESI and earnings is well studied, 
the empirical evidence for a tradeoff is mixed and the mechanism by which increasing ESI 
premiums reduces wages is not well understood (Currie & Madrian 1999). ESI premiums 
increased more than 150% in the two decades prior to the implementation of the ACA and 
premiums markedly increased shortly after the ACA was passed. Since ESI remains the 
prevalent source of insurance coverage, the indirect consequences for earnings is an important 
consideration for policy makers. An offer of ESI voids eligibility for the ACA subsidies, which 
provides low- and middle-income little alternative to the coverage their employer offers in the 
face of an earnings tradeoff.  As the existing literature focuses largely on the average effects of 
ESI premium increases on earnings, the third paper in this dissertation examines the 
distributional effects of ESI premium increases. Identifying vulnerable parts of the earnings 
distribution prior to the ACA can help to simulate and identify potential welfare impacts of the 
ACA policies. 
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CHAPTER 2: DO PREMIUM TAX CREDITS INCREASE PRIVATE HEALTH 
INSURANCE COVERAGE? EVIDENCE FROM THE 2006 MASSACHUSETTS 
HEALTH CARE REFORM 
Introduction 
The costs of health care and health insurance (HI) have increased dramatically over the 
past several decades in the United States. Many individuals and families have relied on 
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) for affordable HI, but ESI has eroded recently as costs 
climb. To attempt to address this, many states have expanded public health insurance (PHI) to 
cover low-income families. In 2006, Massachusetts implemented a novel health reform that 
provided a marketplace for individuals to purchase HI directly. The marketplace was coupled 
with an individual mandate that ensured a large enough risk pool to contain premiums. To further 
incentivize participation, Massachusetts subsidized premiums for individuals below 300% of the 
federal poverty level (FPL).  
Extensive literature has examined the broad impact of the Massachusetts reforms on the 
insured rate (e.g., Pande et al., 2011) and a variety of health and health care utilization outcomes 
(e.g., Kolstad & Kowalski, 2012). A methodological difficulty with such an extensive set of 
policies is to isolate the effects of different policy components. No study to date has looked 
directly at the tax credits. This study uses regression discontinuity (RD) to compare non-group 
private insurance coverage of individuals just below 300% FPL who were eligible for a tax credit 
to individuals just above who were not eligible. 
The tax credits reduce the up-front cost of obtaining HI, but they still require the 
individual to contribute some of the cost. Tax credits represent a new form of income transfer, 
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and their effect has little empirical evidence. Evidence to date has focused on individuals who 
are laid off or are self-employed, and associated subsidies have produced modest, positive 
impacts. Given static premium costs, some consumers may not want HI regardless of the 
subsidy, and some may want it without a subsidy. From a policy maker’s perspective, the 
population of interest is those on the margin of purchasing insurance. The tax credit must be 
large enough to encourage participation for consumers who want insurance but not at pre-reform 
prices. I test whether the tax credits were large enough to increase participation. 
Materials and Methods  
The Current Population Survey (CPS) was chosen because it captures income, HI, and 
demographics before and after the 2006 Massachusetts health reform (Flood et al., 2015). The 
pre-reform period comprises calendar years 1999 through 2006, and the post-reform period 
comprises calendar years 2007 through 2009. The sample includes adults aged 18 to 64 and 
excludes veterans and individuals with imputed HI responses. 
Although individuals can report multiple types of HI in a year, I used three exclusive 
categories for HI based on guidance from the literature: the primary outcome, individually 
purchased insurance (IPI); ESI; and PHI. If an individual reports ESI, they are excluded from 
being in the IPI or PHI. Individuals who report any ESI or IPI are not included in the PHI.  
Using a RD design, the forcing variable is the respondent’s income relative to the FPL. 
FPL is the ratio of total family income to the federally determined poverty threshold. The 
threshold is based on the size of the family. I focus on 300% FPL, which is the upper limit for 
tax credit eligibility. The tax credit had an average value of approximately $1,500 just below 
300% FPL. A series of individual variables is also used to control for potential confounding 
factors: age, gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, family size, urbanicity, education, and self-
reported health status.  
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I estimated the RD model at 300% FPL using both parametric and nonparametric models. 
The base parametric specification is: 
𝐻𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐵(𝐹𝑃𝐿 < 300) 𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑃𝐿(𝑥 − 300)𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐵(𝐹𝑃𝐿 < 300) 𝑖
∗ 𝐹𝑃𝐿(𝑥 − 300)𝑖 + 𝛿𝑿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖         
where HI is a binary HI indicator, SUB is a binary indicator for below 300% FPL. FPL is 
centered at 300%, 𝑿 is a vector of individual demographics described above, and 𝜏𝑖 are year 
fixed effects. 𝜀𝑖 is assumed to be an independently and identically distributed error term. 𝛽1 is the 
treatment effect at the discontinuity. All models use the HI-specific probability weight. I estimate 
the above equation with and without 𝑿 and 𝜏𝑖 and with higher-order FPL terms. Standard errors 
are clustered on the FPL for the parametric models (Lee & Card, 2008). I also pooled each model 
and computed a difference-in-differences effect at the cutoff. Lastly, a non-parametric RD was 
estimated using local linear regression with a triangle kernel density estimator.  
Following Imbens and Lemieux (2008), four sensitivity and falsification tests were used 
to test the robustness of the results: checking for false cutoffs, changing the bandwidth around 
the cutoff, McCrary’s (2008) test manipulation of the forcing variable, and discontinuities in 
demographic characteristics. An additional test examined nonrandom heaping (Barecca et al., 
2011). The sensitivity tests do not meaningfully alter the results of this study. 
One concern suggested by Shu (2016) was manipulation in the FPL in Massachusetts 
around 300% FPL using American Community Survey data. I did not find visual or statistical 
evidence of manipulation in the CPS using more years than Shu (2016). With self-reported 
income, families tend to report incomes rounded to the nearest $1,000 or $5,000 increment. 
Since the FPL variable is created by dividing income by the poverty cutoff, and the poverty 
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cutoff is determined by family size, this creates lumpiness in the histogram (see Online 
Appendix Figures 1 and 2).  
Results  
Table 2.1 presents weighted summary statistics for the 1999–2006 and 2007–2009 
samples between 230% and 370% FPL. The summary statistics demonstrated a slight increase in 
IPI and PHI across time. There was little change in demographic characteristics of the sample 
across time, including education and self-reported health (not presented).  
Figure 2.1 presents the main RD results graphically for the post-reform periods for all 
outcomes, and Table 2.2 presents statistical estimates for the effect shown in Figure 2.1. The 
bottom left panel of Figure 2.1 shows an increase in IPI just below 300% FPL in the post-reform 
period and no detectable effect in the pre-reform period. The nonparametric estimates for IPI are 
a statistically significant increase of 8.4 percentage points, and the cubic model estimates a 19.4 
percentage point effect. The linear and difference-in-differences models are similar in magnitude 
to the non-parametric model, but they are not statistically significant. 
Although IPI is the primary outcome, the remainder of Figure 2.1 and Table 2.2 present 
the broader effects on other HI outcomes. The upper left panel of Figure 2.1 shows that any HI 
coverage decreased slightly in the post-reform period just below 300% FPL. The estimate for 
that effect was 4 to 5 percentage points, and it was not statistically significant. Although 
imprecise, this result suggests that the increase in coverage in IPI due to the subsidies was offset 
by a general decrease in coverage.  
The right two panels of Figure 2.1 explain the decrease in any HI coverage. There was a 
small decrease in the post-reform period for ESI just below 300% FPL, but it was not statistically 
significant. There was a much larger decrease in PHI, but the visual evidence in the PHI panel 
was not as convincing as the IPI panel: there was not a clear break in the PHI trend and much 
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more noise. Still, Table 2.2 suggests that the reduction in PHI was statistically significant in the 
post-reform period, ranging in effect size from 12 to 18 percentage points.  
One potential explanation for the overall decrease in HI and large decrease in PHI is 
crowd-out. However, there were not concurrent Medicaid policy changes at 300% FPL. These 
effects could instead be explained by volatility between ESI and PHI due to the Great Recession. 
For the bin proportions of ESI and PHI in Figure 2.1, spikes in ESI coverage line up with 
decreases in PHI and vice versa. There were not enough observations to test this hypothesis by 
looking at years separately.  
The permutation testing also provided a meaningful check for interpreting the ESI/PHI 
effect. The effect for IPI was largest in magnitude and the test statistic relative to all surrounding 
points in the FPL distribution (see Online Appendix Figure 3), suggesting a valid treatment 
effect. The permutation tests were much less clear for ESI and PHI where there were large 
effects in both directions at multiple false cutoffs between 220% and 300% FPL, suggesting the 
large PHI effects seen at 300% were not associated with the tax credits.  
Discussion  
This study examined the effectiveness of premium tax credits on IPI associated with the 
2006 Massachusetts health reform. I find evidence of an increase in IPI participation among 
those below the 300% FPL cutoff at which individuals become ineligible for subsidized 
insurance but a statistically insignificant decrease in any HI coverage.  
Using the CPS for a single state limits the statistical power and produces multiple 
insignificant findings. Beyond statistical power, the results have several limitations. Receipt of 
subsidies was not directly measured, and the sample size was not large enough to examine single 
years of data. The latter point prevents any analysis before the Great Recession or to better 
investigate volatility in ESI/PHI coverage. There is also a chance that individuals misreported IPI 
9 
as PHI or vice versa, given the strong advocacy and state-branding that occurred with health 
reform. 
Like the Massachusetts health reform, the Affordable Care Act implemented premium tax 
credits for individuals between 138% FPL and 400% FPL in 2014 and cost-sharing subsidies for 
individuals between 138% and 250% FPL. The results presented here indicate that tax credits 
may be an effective means of increasing IPI and bode well for the Affordable Care Act. An RD 
design could be applied nationally to consider both the effects of the tax credits and cost-sharing 
subsidies in the Act.  
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Tables 
Table 2.1 Weighted summary statistics, 230%–370% FPL 
 
1999–2006  2007–2009  
Characteristic N=2,578  N=804 
 
Mean SE  Mean SE 
Any HI 0.82 (0.01)  0.93 (0.010) 
ESI 0.74 (0.01)  0.74 (0.017) 
IPI 0.04 (0.00)  0.06 (0.009) 
PHI 0.04 (0.00)  0.13 (0.013) 
Age 38.53 (0.26)  39.45 (0.498) 
Female 0.53 (0.01)  0.52 (0.019) 
Race          
White 0.86 (0.01)  0.83 (0.014) 
Black 0.08 (0.01)  0.09 (0.011) 
Other/multiple  0.06 (0.01)  0.08 (0.009) 
Hispanic 0.10 (0.01)  0.08 (0.009) 
Marital Status          
Married 0.49 (0.01)  0.49 (0.019) 
Previously married 0.14 (0.01)  0.14 (0.013) 
Never married 0.37 (0.01)  0.37 (0.019) 
Household Size 3.07 (0.04)  3.06 (0.071) 
Note: Summary statistics before and after health reform. 
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Table 2.2. Regressions discontinuity estimates of health insurance uptake at 300% FPL 
 Post-Reform: 2007–2009  Pre-Reform: 1999–2006  
Difference-in-
Differences 
 
Non-
parametric Linear Cubic  
Non-
parametric Linear Cubic  Linear Cubic 
Any HI −0.048 −0.041 −0.128  0.008 −0.021 0.010  −0.068 −0.049 
(0.051) (0.055) (0.104)  (0.032) (0.034) (0.063)  (0.075) (0.143) 
Any IPI 0.084** 0.070 0.194**  −0.002 −0.003 0.050  0.082 0.161 
(0.039) (0.043) (0.092)  (0.017) (0.020) (0.033)  (0.057) (0.120) 
Any ESI −0.013 0.044 −0.132  0.043 0.014 0.032  −0.031 −0.054 
(0.072) (0.082) (0.161)  (0.036) (0.039) (0.075)  (0.101) (0.205) 
Any PHI −0.118** −0.155*** −0.186*  −0.038** −0.032* −0.070  −0.119* −0.155 
(0.049) (0.056) (0.098)  (0.016) (0.019) (0.043)  (0.063) (0.113) 
Notes: * p < 0.10  ** p < 0.05  *** p < 0.01. The sample size is 804 in the post period and 2,578 in the pre-period. 
  
12 
Figures 
Figure 2.1. RD estimates at the 300% FPL cutoff  
  
 
  
Notes: Lines are the predicted trends and the symbols are the unconditional sample proportions, aggregated into 
10% bins. Black lines/symbols are for the post-reform period, and gray lines/symbols are for the pre-reform period. 
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CHAPTER 3: INCENTIVE(LESS)? THE EFFECTIVENESS OF TAX CREDITS AND 
COST-SHARING SUBSIDIES IN THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 
Introduction 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) implemented a complex, 
broad set of changes in the U.S. health insurance and health care system. In 2014, several 
prominent ACA components went into effect. First, insurance mandates require individuals to 
obtain and large employers to offer coverage or pay a penalty. Second, states could choose to 
expand Medicaid eligibility to childless, low-income adults. Third, individuals could purchase 
private insurance through online marketplaces and a receive a subsidy in the form of advance 
premium tax credits (APTCs) and cost-sharing reductions (CSRs) if the income falls between 
100% and 400% of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL). APTCs reduce monthly premium payments 
and CSRs reduce certain elements of cost-sharing, such as co-payments or out-of-pocket 
maximums. The amount of the APTCs and CSRs vary considerably between 100% and 400% 
FPL. 
A systematic review of early evidence suggests that ACA policies have greatly reduced 
the proportion of the population that is uninsured (French et al., 2016). Although early evidence 
suggests that insurance coverage increased substantially, disentangling the mechanisms by which 
consumer behavior is affected is of critical policy importance. Recent working papers use triple 
difference methods to attempt to overcome the challenge of separating the effects of the 2014 
ACA components (Frean, Gruber and Sommers, 2016, Courtemanche et al. 2016). Preliminary 
results from these studies indicate that Medicaid expansion drives much of the increase in the 
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insured rate but the other components, including the APTCs and CSRs, contribute substantially 
to the increase in the insured rate as well. 
Beyond the policy impact on the overall insured rate, the APTCs and CSRs provide an 
opportunity to better understand the elasticity of demand for health insurance. Tax credits have 
been used in the past to incentivize employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) coverage (e.g., Moriya 
and Simon 2016) and individually purchased insurance (IPI) among the self-employed (e.g., 
Heim and Lurie 2009), and have typically yielded relatively low elasticities between -0.6 and -
0.3. Under the ACA, the APTCs and CSRs represent a large expansion of tax credits to a low-
income population, for which there are few elasticity estimates. 
In this study, I exploit the discrete changes in eligibility by income relative to the FPL 
with a regression discontinuity (RD) design to identify the combined and separate effects of the 
APTCs and CSRs. Individuals gain eligibility for both APTCs and CSRs at 100% FPL, lose 
eligibility for CSRs at 250% FPL, and lose eligibility for the APTCs at 400% FPL. In Medicaid 
expansion states, individuals initially gain eligibility at 138% FPL instead of 100% FPL in non-
expansion states. This creates three plausibly exogenous cutoffs where subsidy eligibility 
changes dramatically: 138%/100% FPL with highly subsidized APTCs and CSRs; 250% FPL 
where CSRs are no longer available; and 400% FPL where APTCs are no longer available. In 
this way, the lowest cutoff tests the combined APTC/CSR subsidy, the middle cutoff tests for 
changes associated with the CSRs, and the highest cutoff tests for an APTC-only effect.  
I use data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) to test for effects on health 
insurance take up at each of the three cutoffs in 2014. As a validity check, I also examine pre-
2014 data. An important assumption for RD is that the forcing variable cannot be manipulated. 
Given potential concerns that income can be manipulated, my approach robustly tests for 
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evidence of bunching around the cutoffs. Prior studies focusing on the Massachusetts reform use 
RD and find no evidence of income manipulation (Hinde 2016, Chandra, Gruber and McKnight 
2010, 2014). In contrast to other studies that examine APTCs and CSRs, I use an income 
definition more consistent with actual APTC/CSR eligibility. The design also does not require 
the identification of control group, which is problematic for ACA studies using difference-in-
differences given the widespread reach of the ACA. By focusing on the discrete changes at each 
cutoff, it possible to separately examine the APTCs from the CSRs. 
I find strong evidence of a 4.8 to 5.4 percentage point increase in IPI just above 138% 
FPL in Medicaid expansion states, where subsidized insurance coverage is first available and 
individuals are just ineligible for the expanded Medicaid program. At the 138% FPL cutoff, I 
estimate an elasticity of demand for health insurance ranging from -0.65 to -0.58. In non-
expansion states, the effects above 100% FPL are slightly smaller in magnitude and not 
statistically significant for the general population, but is instead concentrated among 20-to-39 
year olds. There is no evidence of an effect at the 250% FPL cutoff attributable solely to the 
CSRs. I do find suggestive evidence of an increase in IPI at the 400% FPL cutoff attributable to 
the APTC in states that implemented a state-based exchange. 
More broadly, my results suggest that there are negligible effects on the overall insured 
rate in Medicaid expansion states at each cutoff, and positive, but insignificant, effects at each 
cutoff in non-expansion states. This signals a minimal level of crowding-out. Stratifying by 
demographic characteristics, I do not find strong evidence of adverse selection based on self-
reported health status. Positive effect sizes for IPI are similar across married / single individuals 
and younger / older adults in expansion states, but the increases are offset by reductions in public 
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health insurance (PHI) for married individuals and employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) for non-
married individuals.  
While similar tax credits have been used in past programs related to self-employment and 
for recently unemployed individuals, the results here suggest that these ACA tax credits may 
have broader appeal for lower-income individuals. The estimated elasticities are also on the high 
end of existing estimates, suggesting low-income individuals may be more price responsive than 
previous studies have found. There is no evidence for changes in IPI coverage at 250% FPL and 
weak evidence for changes at 400% FPL, consistent with existing low elasticity estimates for 
higher income individuals.  
One policy implication is that the APTC and CSR levels would need to be raised at 
higher incomes to induce more participation. Furthermore, these results suggest the long-term 
impact beyond the lowest-income group could be minimal. However, given that the individual 
mandate penalty and the exchange premium increases in 2015 could further incentivize 
participation, consumer awareness of and responsiveness to these changes are a key determinant 
of how much the APTC and CSR levels would need to be raised in the future. 
Background 
Institutional Setting 
The primary focus of this analysis is to examine the impact of APTCs and CSRs that are 
available first in 2014 to certain income bands of the population and are obtained through state-
based exchanges (SBE) or a federally-facilitated exchange (FFE). The ACA initiated HI 
exchanges, online marketplaces to facilitate small group and individual HI plan purchases. Given 
the historically higher premiums individuals and small groups face, the exchanges were intended 
to mimic the risk pools of large companies and provide more affordable premiums. States were 
required to either design, regulate, and implement an SBE or defer to the FFE. In some cases, 
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states opted for a partnership arrangement, whereby the state incorporated some components of 
the SBE but still deferred to the FFE for the enrollment process. In 2014, 17 states chose SBEs, 
27 chose FFEs, and 7 chose a partnership arrangement. 
To increase affordability of exchange plans, the ACA subsidized premiums to a varying 
degree for individuals with incomes between 100% and 400% of the FPL. The ACA 
implemented APTCs for individuals between 100% and 400% FPL and CSRs for individuals 
between 100% and 250% FPL. For 2014, income thresholds for single individuals were $11,490 
(100% FPL), $15,856 (138% FPL), $28,725 ($250% FPL) and $45,960 (400% FPL) (KFF, 
2014a). The value of APTCs fall on a sliding scale, where individuals receive a higher relative 
subsidy at lower income levels. At 400% FPL, the income cap in 2014 was 9.5%, yielding a 
$4,320 maximum annual premium for an individual, or $363 monthly. At the bottom end at 
100% FPL, the cap was 2%, yielding a maximum annual premium of $230, or $20 monthly. The 
amount of the APTC was the difference between the total annual premium and the income cap 
and was normalized to the price of the second lowest silver tier plan, so that individuals did not 
receive a higher subsidy for choosing a gold or platinum tier plan. The APTC could be applied at 
the time of enrollment to reduce monthly payments (referred to as the advanced premium tax 
credit) or collected in a lump sum through income tax filings.  In 2014, 85% of consumers who 
enrolled in the exchange received the APTC (ASPE 2014). 
The CSR subsidy was available to individuals between 100% and 250% FPL and 
increased the actuarial value of the silver plan to 94% for those between 100%–150% FPL, 87% 
for those 150%–200% FPL, and 73% for those 200%–250% FPL. Again, CSRs were normalized 
to the silver plan. When an individual below 250% FPL chose an exchange plan, the subsidy 
reduced the face value of the deductible, the out-of-pocket maximum, and co-payments 
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associated with the plan. For example, an exchange plan might have had a $2,000 deductible, a 
$6,400 out-of-pocket maximum, and a $45 co-payment for primary care physician visits. For an 
individual with income between 150%–200% FPL, the cost-sharing subsidy would have reduced 
the deductible to $500, the out-of-pocket maximum was capped at $2,250, and the co-payment is 
reduced to $15. Other than regulations on the out-of-pocket maximum, insurers could choose 
how to balance the deductible/co-payment mix to achieve an actuarial value of 87% for the 
150%–200% FPL cost-sharing subsidy. 
In this analysis, I focus on consumer health insurance decisions around each of three 
eligibility cutoffs: 100%/138% FPL, 250% FPL, and 400% FPL. Table 3.1 describes how 
program eligibility changes across the different FPL cutoffs. I use 138% FPL for Medicaid 
expansion states instead of 100% FPL to avoid overlap with expanded Medicaid eligibility. The 
RD design compares individuals just above and below each of the three FPL cutoffs. In what 
follows, I refer to changes around the 100%/138% FPL cutoffs as a combined effect of the 
APTCs and CSRs. Just above 100%/138% FPL, individuals gain eligibility to the dual incentive.  
For expansion states, those who fall below 138% FPL are potentially eligible for Medicaid, so 
this effect may be capturing changes in preferences between public and private coverage.  In 
non-expansion states, a coverage gap exists, where individuals below 100% FPL have no access 
to APTCs/CSRs and are unlikely to be newly eligible for Medicaid. Thus, the incentive is 
different and potentially much more valuable in non-expansion states. 
An effect at the 250% FPL cutoff would be attributed to the CSRs. Individuals just below 
and just above 250% FPL both have access to the APTCs, while individuals just below 250% 
FPL are eligible for CSRs and individuals above 250% FPL do not. The APTC does not change 
discretely at 250% FPL, only the availability of the CSR. Lastly, I refer to the changes around 
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the 400% FPL cutoff as the effect of the APTC only, comparing individuals just below 400% 
FPL that are eligible for APTCs and individuals just above 400% FPL that are ineligible.  
A second incentive to health insurance participation is an individual mandate that 
requires all individuals to obtain a minimum 60% actuarial value HI plan or pay a lump sum tax 
($95 or 1% of income per adult in 2014, $325 per adult in 2015, and $695 per adult in 2016) 
(KFF, 2014b). Furthermore, the penalty is not applied to individuals with incomes that fall below 
the tax filing threshold or 138% FPL in states that do not expand Medicaid, Native Americans, or 
if the lowest exchange premium available is greater than 8% of income. Given the low level of 
the tax in 2014, the contamination of this component is assumed to be zero for this analysis.  
This is consistent with preliminary evidence that the mandate had little effect on insurance 
coverage (Frean, Gruber, and Sommers, 2016). 
This analysis does not formally examine Medicaid expansion, which extends Medicaid 
eligibility to childless adults under 138% FPL. Medicaid expansion interacts with the analyses 
here, since many individuals are newly eligible just below 138% FPL. An intended effect of the 
research design is that many individuals should lose eligibility for Medicaid coverage above 
138% FPL in states that choose to expand. This is not a policy effect in the context of the current 
study in as much as a validity check. 
Prior Literature 
This analysis contributes to the expanding empirical evidence of the impacts of the ACA. 
Several organizations conducted nationally representative surveys to track early impacts of the 
2014 ACA components including Medicaid expansion, individual and large employer mandates, 
and private HI exchanges. Descriptive results from the Health Reform Monitoring Survey 
indicate a regression-adjusted increase in the insured rate of 5.3 percentage points among adults 
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with an income 138%–399% FPL through June 2014 and a 7.4 percentage point increase through 
March 2015 (Long et al., 2014, 2015). The gains vary by age, race/ethnicity, and gender and are 
potentially larger in Medicaid expansion states. Among those uninsured between 138%–399% 
FPL, almost half of respondents were unaware of the incentives, approximately 60% were 
uninsured primarily due to costs of insurance, and 20% did not want insurance or would rather 
pay the nonparticipation fine (Shartzer et al., 2014). Estimates from the Gallup Poll and National 
Health Interview Survey find similar reductions in the proportion of uninsured (e.g., Black and 
Cohen, 2014; Sommers et al., 2015).   
Two recent studies use a triple difference method, taking advantage of pre-2014 variation 
in the local area uninsured rate, to separate the effects of the different ACA components on 
insurance coverage. Courtemanche et al. (2016) use cross-state variation in Medicaid expansion 
status and estimate a 5.9 percentage point increase in the insured rate.  They attribute half of the 
increase to Medicaid expansion and the other half to ACA components. Frean, Gruber and 
Sommers (2016) use variation in premiums across geographic regions to separate the effects of 
APTCs, individual mandate, and Medicaid expansion. They find the APTCs account for 37% of 
the observed reduction in the uninsured rate and Medicaid expansion accounts for 63%. They 
further describe that most of the Medicaid expansion effects are driven by a woodwork effect – 
increased uptake by previously eligible individuals.  For the APTCs, Frean, Gruber and Sommers 
(2016) estimate a small average price elasticity of -0.05. While Courtemanche et al. (2016) find 
evidence for a partial crowding out of public insurance, Frean, Gruber and Sommers (2016) find 
no evidence of crowding out. 
Other quasi-experimental analyses of specific ACA components focus on early 
expanding states and other components implemented prior to 2014, such as the dependent care 
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mandate. For example, Golberstein et al. (2015) find large increases in public HI (PHI) coverage 
associated with Medicaid expansion in California. Kaestner and colleagues (2015) used 
difference-in-differences and synthetic control methods to estimate an approximately 4 
percentage point increase in PHI due to early Medicaid expansions. Evidence from the 
dependent-coverage mandate indicates a marked increase in insurance coverage among those 
less than 26 years of age (e.g., Antwi et al., 2013).  
Several other studies examine the impact of the ACA on ESI. Survey data from the Urban 
Institute show little evidence of changes in ESI availability, ESI take-up, and ESI coverage, but 
offer suggestive evidence that ESI coverage increases for employees of small employers and low 
incomes (Blavin et al., 2015). The 2015 Employer Health Benefits Survey indicates an increase 
in ESI premiums consistent with increases from previous years and notes little change in benefit 
design (Claxton et al. 2015). The rapid response surveys provide suggestive evidence of 
anticipatory changes in offer and benefit design to meet ACA requirements, but little overall 
impact on ESI. 
Beyond the policy effects of the ACA itself, this study links to the broader literature on 
the demand elasticity for health insurance. A wide range of empirical studies have produced 
varying elasticity estimates across ESI and IPI plans, ranging from almost zero to above one. 
Early studies focusing on variation in employee contributions and the tax deductibility of 
employee premiums estimate highly inelastic demand in the range of -0.05 to -0.02 (e.g., 
Blumberg, Nichols and Banthin 2001, Chernew, Frick and McLaughlin 1997; Gruber and 
Washington 2005).  These early studies estimate the elasticity based off the employee portion of 
the premium. Over time, a separate literature focusing on the relationship between ESI costs and 
wages suggests that employees bear the full cost of changes in ESI premium, and thus the 
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relevant base for the elasticity estimate should be the total premium cost. This shift in thought 
suggests the early estimates are potentially low (e.g., Baicker and Chandra 2006). 
For non-ESI elasticities, another literature focuses on subsidies for self-employed and 
recently unemployed. Gruber and Poterba (1994) compare how changes in tax deductibility 
affect insurance among self-employed individuals compared to employed individuals and 
estimate an elasticity between -3 and -1. Using an individual fixed effects model, a more recent 
study by Heim and Lurie (2009) estimates a smaller elasticity for the self-employed, between -
0.6 and -0.3. The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2008 provided health insurance 
subsidies to recently unemployed individuals who previously had access to ESI. The ARRA 
subsidy lets individuals pay 35 percent of the full ESI premium while the employer is repaid 65 
percent of the subsidy by the government. Moriya and Simon (2016) estimate an elasticity of -
0.38 to -0.27. These studies yield moderate price elasticities for narrowly defined populations – 
self-employed and recently unemployed individuals. The APTC apply to a broader portion of the 
population, and a potentially different population – lower-income individuals. 
The APTCs and CSRs in the ACA are modeled after the 2006 Massachusetts reform. A 
recent study applies a similar RD design and methods used in this analysis to examine the impact 
of APTCs implemented in Massachusetts in 2006 (Hinde 2016). As a part of the Massachusetts 
reform, APTCs were offered to individuals below 300% FPL. Using a regression discontinuity 
design, the study estimates a 7 to 9 percentage point increase in IPI just below 300% FPL 
associated with the APTCs. A pair of RD studies by Chandra, Gruber and McKnight (2010, 
2014) uses the change in CSRs at several FPL cutoffs as exogenous cutoffs to estimate demand 
elasticities for medical care services. They estimate an elasticity of -0.16 across various medical 
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services, similar to the elasticity estimated in the seminal RAND Health Insurance Experiment 
(Newhouse 1993). 
A recent working paper by Pauly et al. (2015) simulates financial implications and 
welfare changes associated with the 2014 APTCs and CSRs. Their results indicate that the 
additional financial burden of purchasing HI are offset by increases in welfare due to expected 
medical care prices for individuals below 250%. Aligning with these projections, I hypothesize 
the effects may be strongest at 100%/138% and 250%, where consumers have access to the 
APTCs and CSRs. Combined with the low elasticity estimate from Chandra, Gruber and 
McKnight (2014), the effect at 250% FPL is likely to be weaker, since the change in the CSR is 
lower across that cutoff.   
Methods 
Data 
I use the Current Population Survey (CPS) Annual Social and Economic Supplement 
(ASEC) because it captures income, HI status, and demographics representatively at the national 
and state level (Flood et al., 2015). The analyses focus on 2014, the first year the APTC and CSR 
subsidies are available. As a validity check, I use a pre-reform period pooling data from calendar 
years 2010–2012. The ASEC was redesigned for the March 2014 survey so that the health 
insurance questions better match the American Community Survey (ACS).  The ACS questions 
include current coverage, while the old ASEC questions include whether household members 
had coverage in the past year. The redesigned ASEC includes information about current and 
previous year coverage. The redesigned questions also include whether specific household 
members are covered by a specific type of insurance, and once coverage type is identified, 
whether other household members are covered by that specific type. The Census Bureau 
recommends against directly comparing ASEC HI measures before and after 2013 until methods 
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are developed to correct for differences in the series (Pascale et al. 2016). Therefore, the pre-
period cannot currently be used as a baseline for 2014 changes. Furthermore, I exclude calendar 
year 2013 from the pre-period due to concerns about respondents reporting current coverage as 
of March 2014 instead of past year coverage (Swartz 1986). 
The analytic sample includes adults aged 26 to 64. Individuals over 64 are almost 
universally covered by Medicare. Any individual with an allocated HI status is also dropped; HI 
status is allocated for some respondents based on other answers and information on the 
respondent’s record or imputed if the interview was not fully completed. Allocation does not 
include logical imputation for PHI. Lastly, I also drop respondents residing in Massachusetts due 
to pre-existing health reform policies that directly overlap with the ACA policies. 
The main outcome is past year HI status. I measure whether respondents had any HI and 
four exclusive categories of HI: IPI, ESI, and PHI, or uninsured. If an individual reports ESI 
coverage during a given year, he or she is not assigned IPI or PHI. Individuals who report any 
ESI or IPI are not assigned PHI. The primary independent variable is the respondent’s income 
relative to the FPL. FPL is the ratio of the total family income to the federally determined 
poverty threshold. The poverty threshold is based on the size of the family. Binary indicators are 
used to denote incomes that fell below 400% and 250% and above 100%/138% FPL; these 
capture the eligibility cutoffs for different components of the ACA in the RD design.  As noted, 
there is a difference in the lowest cutoff between expansion (138% FPL) and non-expansion 
states (100% FPL). 
Subsidy eligibility is based on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI), not gross income 
as directly reported in the ASEC. Because of this, I calculate income relative to the FPL using a 
Census Bureau-provided measure of adjusted gross income (AGI) that is created using statistical 
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matching with Internal Revenue Service (IRS) tax records (O’Hara 2004). AGI removes certain 
tax deductions and exemptions from gross income; AGI is lower than gross income. MAGI 
includes foreign-earned income, tax-exempt interest and non-taxable social security benefits. At 
lower income levels, the difference between MAGI and AGI is likely small.1 Statistical matching 
introduces a potential source of measurement error, but there are not better sources that capture 
AGI beyond the IRS data (conversely, the IRS data do not historically measure broader HI 
coverage well). To account for differences between MAGI and AGI, all models exclude 
observations within 1% FPL of the cutoff to conservatively estimate the policy effects. The 
results are not sensitive to alternative models that include observations within 1% FPL 
The AGI statistical match is made on household heads. I logically assign the imputed 
AGI to household members since the eligibility decision is made at the household level. The 
results do not change if only household heads are used. Rather, the standard errors improve, 
providing indirect evidence of measurement error. The results presented here are conservative. 
A series of covariates are also used to control for potential confounding factors: age, 
gender, race, ethnicity, marital status, family size, living in a metropolitan statistical area, 
education, self-reported health status, Census region, and state of residence. Age and family size 
are treated as continuous variables, while binary indicators are used for the remaining individual 
controls. 
                                                 
1 Based on author’s calculations using the 2014 IRS SOI (https://www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-
tax-returns-publication-1304-complete-report#_IndReturns). For reported AGI’s less than $50,000, the average 
foreign-earned income is $52 and the average tax-exempt interest is $143. For AGIs less than $100,000 the average 
difference between MAGI and AGI is less than 1%. Above $100,000 the average difference is between 1% and 2%. 
Non-taxable social security benefits are excluded given the sample restriction to the non-elderly (Supplemental 
social income is not included in the MAGI calculation) 
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Empirical Methods 
To estimate the effects of the APTCs and CSRs on coverage, a sharp RD design is 
applied using the 100%/138%, 250%, and 400% FPL cutoffs in 2014 as exogenous forcing 
variables.2 The estimation approach logically separates the sample into two groups: expansion 
and non-expansion states. The 138% cutoff only applies to expansion states, and the 100% FPL 
cutoff to non-expansion states, requiring separation when examining the lowest cutoff. Twenty-
eight states expanded Medicaid by 2014 to include childless adults below 138% FPL. 
RD compares individuals just below and just above each FPL cutoff, assuming that the 
only difference between individuals is eligibility for the APTCs, CSRs, or Medicaid. Hinde 
(2016) uses exact design and data source to estimate the impact of the tax credits available below 
300% FPL in Massachusetts in 2006 (Hinde 2016) and Chandra, Gruber and McKnight (2010, 
2014) use FPL cutoffs as an exogenous source of variation to examine CSRs used in the 2006 
Massachusetts reform. 
RD is first estimated non-parametrically using local linear regression with a triangle 
kernel density estimator. Multiple bandwidths are used for the local linear estimation to examine 
sensitivity to the bandwidth (Lee and Lemieux 2010). RD is also estimated using a standard 
linear specification. The following specification references the 100% FPL cutoff, but applies 
similarly to the other cutoffs.3 
                                                 
2 One could argue that a fuzzy RD would be better in this context given the measurement errors concerns described 
in the previous section. For a fuzzy RD design, one would need to know whether an individual receives APTC and 
CSR subsidies to serve as the first-stage outcome. Since the CPS does not capture whether or not an individual 
receives the APTCs and CSRs, the outcome for the first-stage is missing and a fuzzy RD is not possible. 
3 For the 250% and 400% FPL cutoff, the SUB variable refers to being just below the cutoff, reversing the inequality 
in the above equation. 
 27 
𝐻𝐼𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑈𝐵(𝐹𝑃𝐿 > 100) 𝑖 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑃𝐿(𝑥 − 100)𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑆𝑈𝐵(𝐹𝑃𝐿 > 100) 𝑖
∗ 𝐹𝑃𝐿(𝑥 − 100)𝑖 + 𝛿𝑿𝑖 + 𝛾𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖         
where HI is a binary HI indicator, and SUB is a binary indicator for above 100% FPL, FPL is 
centered at 100% FPL, 𝑿 is a vector of the individual demographics described above, and 𝛾𝑠 are 
state fixed effects. 𝜀𝑖 is assumed to be an independently and identically distributed error term. 
The FPL cutoff indicator and the continuous FPL measure are interacted to allow the slope of the 
FPL trend to vary on either side of the cutoff. 𝛽1 represents the treatment effect at the 
discontinuity. The nonparametric model estimates the equivalent of 𝛽1 but without imposing 
linearity of trends. I report detailed treatment effects for any HI and IPI, the categories directly 
affected by the APTCs and CSRs. For completeness, I also report estimates for ESI and PHI. The 
above equation is also estimated for the pre-period separately and presented in Appendix Table 1 
and Appendix Figures 4 to 7.  Pre-period estimates include year fixed effects. 
To test for improvements in fit of the parametric form, I use higher order FPL terms in 
the parametric model. Models are estimated with and without the vector of individual-level 
controls. The models are not generally sensitive to higher order terms or covariate inclusion. 
Standard errors are clustered on the FPL for all models, as recommended by Lee and Card 
(2008) to account for the potential discreteness of the forcing variable. Results are not sensitive 
to alternative standard error calculations, such as heteroscedastic-robust standard errors or 
standard errors clustered at the state level. All reported models use ASEC supplement probability 
weights to account for oversampling in the CPS. The probability weights may cause imprecision, 
so I re-estimate the main models without weighting (Solon, Haider and Wooldridge 2015). For 
the unweighted models, the standard errors are not different, but the effects are smaller in 
magnitude and sometimes insignificant. 
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A potential concern with this application of RD is that income can be manipulated, which 
would threaten identification. Historically, programs enforced through the tax code, such as the 
EITC, have been known to cause kink points in the income distribution (e.g., Saez 2010). Unlike 
other tax-based policies, such as the EITC, the APTC and CSR are not pure income transfers. In 
this context, there is also a temporal disconnect between the enrollment decision and tax 
reconciliation. The enrollment period for the exchanges occurs in the fall months prior to the 
beginning of the next calendar year.4 Thus, individuals prospectively decide to enroll based on 
projected income. The final amount of the APTC is not determined until tax filing the following 
year, where a repayment penalty occurs if individuals underestimate income.  
The RD design is focused on the availability of the APTCs and CSRs at certain FPL 
thresholds, not the actual receipt of the incentives. To manipulate income to maintain eligibility, 
one could alter labor supply to affect earnings or take advantage of various tax credits and 
deductions, such as individual retirement account contributions, at tax filing to get under a 
threshold. To test for this type of manipulation, I look for evidence of income bunching around 
the FPL thresholds and changes in labor market behavior. I also estimate the McCrary (2008) test 
for discontinuities in the distribution near the cutoffs. To preview results of the manipulation 
tests, I do not find evidence that incomes are manipulated and argue that the design is valid given 
the prospective nature of the enrollment decision.  This is consistent with a previous study on the 
Massachusetts reform (Hinde 2016). 
Four other standard sensitivity and falsification tests are used to test the robustness of the 
results (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). First, I use a search procedure to move the cutoff around 
arbitrarily and test for treatment effects. The “false” cutoffs should have smaller treatment effects 
                                                 
4 Open enrollment for calendar year 2014 lasted from October 2013 through March 2014.  
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in absolute magnitude and smaller test statistics than the actual cutoff (Imbens and Lemieux, 
2008). The cutoff is arbitrarily moved from 38% FPL to 238% FPL, 150% FPL to 250% FPL, 
and 300% FPL to 500% FPL in 5% increments, and potential discontinuities were examined at 
each arbitrary cutoff. 
Second, different bandwidths around the cutoffs are tested to examine the sensitivity of 
the results to bandwidth selection. There is no theoretical guidance on optimal bandwidth 
selection. There is a tradeoff between bias and precision in determining the bandwidth: wider 
bandwidths are more likely to be biased and are more precise, whereas narrower bandwidths are 
less likely to be biased and are less precise. The selected bandwidth is 70%, and the bandwidth is 
allowed to vary between 25% and 100%. 
Third, I examine nonrandom heaping with the FPL, a concern raised by Barreca et al. 
(2011, 2012; see also Almond et al., 2011). This test deals with the fact that respondents tend to 
report income in $1,000 or $10,000 increments, potentially leading to blips in the disaggregated 
data series. This is distinct from a discontinuity in the density of the sample distribution, which 
may indicate manipulation of the forcing variable. Nonrandom heaping close to the cutoff can 
potentially bias the treatment effects. Barreca et al. (2011) recommend a donut-hole RD, where 
the heap is dropped from the estimation procedure. The exclusion of observations within 1% 
FPL constitutes a donut-hole RD. 
Finally, I examine concurrent discontinuities in covariates at the cutoff that could 
threaten identification. 
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Results 
Main Results 
Table 3.2 presents summary statistics around each cutoff for expansion and non-
expansion states, respectively. Across all states, any HI and ESI coverage increases as income 
increases, while IPI decreases slightly from the lower to higher incomes. Across both expansion 
and non-expansion states, IPI coverage is similar at each cutoff. The main difference in HI 
coverage across expansion and non-expansion states comes from the 8 percentage point 
difference for PHI around 138% FPL in expansion states. There are some minor differences in 
other demographic characteristics between lower and high incomes. Namely, as income 
increases individuals are more likely be older, married, white, and well-educated. 
A critical assumption for an RD design is that there is no manipulation in the forcing 
variable. This assumption can be visually assessed with histograms by checking for 
discontinuities in the FPL sample distribution at the cutoff and estimating the McCrary (2008) 
test for manipulation. Figure 3.1 presents a histogram for the expansion and non-expansion states 
for 2010-2012 and 2014. There is no visual evidence of mass points occurring near the cutoffs 
that would indicate manipulation nor large changes across time. Likewise, the McCrary test does 
not indicate large or significant differences in the FPL density at any cutoff.  To further assess 
manipulation, I examine labor market outcomes at each of the cutoffs, since altering labor supply 
is one way to alter income. I find no differences at the cutoffs in labor force participation, 
unemployment, self-employment, or part-time status (results available upon request). There is no 
evidence of any income manipulation that would invalidate the RD design. 
To visually assess the effects of the combined APTCs and CSRs, Figures 3.2 through 3.5 
show HI coverage across the FPL distribution for the four types of HI. The hollow circle 
symbols represent the unconditional proportion covered by the HI type within a 5% FPL bin. The 
 31 
figures also impose a local linear trend between the cutoffs to visualize potential treatment 
effects near the cutoffs. 
In Figure 3.2, while the proportion with any HI increases over the FPL distribution, there 
are no clear breaks at any of the cutoffs, except for a potential dip in any HI coverage just below 
250% FPL in non-expansion states. For expansion states in the top panel of Figure 3.3, there is a 
noticeable increase in the scatterplot just above 138% FPL and the local linear trends suggest a 
large, positive effect on IPI coverage relative to those below 138% FPL. Moving further above 
138% FPL, the scatterplot and local linear curve trend downward until 400% FPL where it 
appeared to flatten out. There is no visual evidence of a treatment effect near 250% in the 
scatterplot, but the local linear curves indicate a small, negative effect just below 250% FPL. 
Near 400% FPL, the change in the FPL trends indicate a small, positive effect. 
For non-expansion states in the bottom panel of Figure 3.3, the plot looks quite similar to 
expansion states. There is an apparent effect just above 100% FPL, similar in magnitude to the 
effect above 138% FPL in expansion states, although not as clean. Between 100% FPL and 
250% FPL, the IPI trend declines until it flattens out above 250% FPL. There is a small, negative 
effect just below 250% FPL and just below 400% FPL according to the local linear trends, but 
again, the visual evidence for an effect is weak.  
Beyond IPI coverage, I examine changes in ESI and PHI at the same three cutoffs in 
expansion and non-expansion states. Figure 3.4 shows ESI coverage across the FPL distribution. 
ESI coverage increases greatly as the FPL increases, but there is little evidence of any jumps 
around the cutoffs in either state grouping. In Figure 3.5 describing PHI coverage, there is a 
noticeable drop-off in PHI just above 138% FPL in expansion states and just above 100% FPL in 
non-expansion states. There are no effects at the other two cutoffs.  
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Statistical estimates of the treatment effects are presented in Table 3.3. For expansion 
states, there are negligible changes in any HI coverage at all three cutoffs. The overall changes in 
the insured rate are not statistically significant, and for expansion states, suggest a minimal level 
of crowding out from Medicaid expansion. The increase in IPI is offset by a 1.3 to 2.3 percentage 
point drop in ESI and a 3.1-3.2 percentage point drop in PHI. For IPI, the combined treatment 
effect just above 138% FPL in expansion states is 5.4 percentage points in the non-parametric 
model and 4.8 percentage points in the linear model. Both estimates are statistically significant. 
The proportion covered by IPI between 68% and 138% FPL in 2014 is 0.104.  The percentage 
increase associated with the combined incentive, therefore, ranges from 46.6% to 52.5%. Per 
ASPE reports from the FFE, the APTC reduced the average premium by 80%, implying an 
elasticity ranging from -0.65 to -0.58 (ASPE 2014).  
Among the non-expansion states, there is a non-parametric 4.3 percentage point effect 
and a linear 3.4 percentage point effect for any HI at 100% FPL, although it is insignificant. The 
combined incentive effect for IPI just above 100% FPL is a smaller 2.3 percentage points and 
statistically insignificant. However, there is a similar increase in ESI of 1.7 to 2.6 percentage 
points. 
Confirming the visual evidence in Figure 3.3, I do not find evidence of an effect on any 
HI coverage or a cost-sharing treatment effect for IPI just below 250% FPL. For expansion 
states, there is an insignificant 1.3 percentage point reduction in IPI just below 250% FPL.  
There is a marginally significant drop in any HI coverage of 3.9 percentage points in non-
expansion states just below 250% FPL, but the IPI effects are negligible. Instead, the decrease is 
driven by an insignificant 3.6 to 4.2 percentage point decrease in ESI just below 250% FPL. 
 33 
 Contrary to the visual evidence of a positive effect just below 400% FPL in expansion 
states, the statistical estimate is positive but small and insignificant. A separate model focusing 
solely on the SBE states estimates a 3.6 percentage point increase in IPI just below 400% FPL 
and the effect was significant at the 10% level. Again, there is no evidence of any effects near 
400% FPL in non-expansion states 
In summary of the IPI results, I find strong evidence of a combined effect of the APTCs 
and CSRs just above 138% FPL in expansion states and less robust evidence of a combined 
effect just above 100% FPL in non-expansion states, where the incentives are strongest. There is 
no robust statistical evidence to support a CSR effect and only suggestive evidence of an APTC 
effect in SBE states. The positive effects for the combined incentive and APTC-only imply that 
the APTCs could be the driving incentive for consumers on the margin. 
As a validity check, a separate set of analyses reproduce the main results for the 2010–
2012 period, available in Appendix Table 1 and Appendix Figures 4–6. No effects are found in 
the pre-period at 100%/138% FPL and 400% FPL. There is weak statistical evidence of a 2.4 
percentage point increase in any HI coverage just below 250% FPL in expansion states and 1.5-
1.6 percentage point increase in IPI just below 250% in non-expansion states. In both cases, there 
is not strong visual evidence of a jump in coverage. When disaggregated by year, all 3 effects 
dissipate. Given the sensitivity of the effects across years and the lack of visual evidence, there is 
little concern that the design is invalid for the 250% FPL cutoff.  
Heterogeneous Effects  
Long-term sustainability of the marketplace is in many ways tied to conformation by 
younger, healthier individuals to diversify the risk pool of the exchanges. To test whether the 
observed effects above 138% FPL in expansion states and above 100% FPL in non-expansion 
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states are concentrated among a particular demographic, I stratify the models in Table 3.3 by 
three key characteristics: relationship status, self-reported health status, and age group. The 
estimates are presented in Table 3.4 for expansion states and Table 5 for non-expansion states. 
Starting with expansion states in Table 3.4, there is a net increase in the insured rate for 
married individuals and a net decrease in non-married individuals. The combined effect of the 
APTCs and CSRs for IPI is slightly higher for married (approximately 5.5 percentage points) 
than non-married individuals (4.6 to 5.3 percentage points), but not practically different. The 
differences in any HI coverage across marital status is driven by ESI and PHI. There is a 
reduction of 5.9 to 6.2 percentage points in PHI for married individuals, whereas non-married 
individuals have a reduction in ESI of approximately 5.4 to 6.6 percentage points. The PHI drop-
off is consistent with Medicaid ineligibility, but the ESI drop-off for single individuals is 
unexpected. This could be evidence of switching away from ESI toward IPI.  
The next stratification is by self-reported health status, comparing individuals who 
reported being in excellent or very good health against individuals who reported being in good, 
fair, or poor health. Referring back to Table 3.2, there are too few individuals in fair and poor 
health to analyze separately. When stratified by health status, the combined effect is unchanged 
for the higher self-reported health group, and is somewhat attenuated for the lower self-reported 
health group for the linear specification. A reduction in PHI is observed only for the lower self-
reported health group. Overall, there are negligible effects on the insured rate among the higher 
self-reported health or the lower self-reported health group. At least the extensive margin, there 
is no evidence of adverse selection in IPI take-up. 
The bottom portion of Table 3.4 compares the effects for individuals aged 26 to 39 and 
individuals aged 40 to 64. While imprecise, there is a marginally significant increase in any HI 
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for the younger group and a negative, insignificant decrease in any HI in the older group. There 
is a small difference in the 3.6 to 4.7 percentage point combined effect and 5.8 to 6.1 percentage 
effect on IPI between younger and older groups, respectively. As with the marriage stratification, 
the older group experiences a reduction in PHI between 6.1 and 7 percentage points attributable 
to Medicaid ineligibility above 138% FPL, while the younger group does not see a 
countervailing reduction in ESI comparable to the non-married group.  
Table 3.4 provides three implications. First, there are only minor differences in the effect 
of the combined incentives on IPI across marital status and age group. Second, there is an 
interesting dynamic of non-married individuals dropping off ESI coverage just above 138% FPL. 
Third, the non-married, older age groups see small net declines in the insured rate that are 
associated with Medicaid ineligibility. In one sense, the results suggest that the desired effect of 
incentivizing, young, single and healthy individuals worked. In another sense, the net decrease in 
the insured rate for potentially vulnerable groups, signals a small crowding out effect. 
For the non-expansion states in Table 3.5, there are three interesting findings. First, there 
is an increase in any HI for all groups except those reporting good, fair or poor health. Thus, the 
any HI significant for those in self-reported excellent or very good health is large, positive and 
significant. The 6.5 to 9 percentage point effect is driven by approximately equal increases in IPI 
and ESI. However, the increase in IPI and ESI is not significant. There is not the dynamic 
tradeoff in ESI and PHI as with the expansion states and little evidence of crowd-out. 
Second, there is a significant combined effect on IPI for the 26- to 39-year-old age group 
of 5.1 to 5.3 percentage points. The 5.1 to 5.3 percentage point increase in IPI among young 
adults is a slightly larger than estimate of the combined effect for young adults in expansion 
states. The effects for 40- to 64-year-old respondents are negligible. Since older adults face 
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higher premium levels, the relative value of the subsidy should be higher for older adults and the 
lack of an effect is counterintuitive. It may point to issues in navigating the FFE and minimal 
outreach and navigational assistance in most non-expanding states, given the positive correlation 
between Medicaid expansion and adoption of a state-based exchange. 
HI Premiums and Medical Spending 
The results so far focus on the extensive margin of obtaining IPI. Beginning with the 
2011 ASEC, respondents are asked to self-report HI premiums and out-of-pocket medical 
expenditures. The limited sample size in the CPS prevented in-depth statistical examination of 
the impact on premiums and out-of-pocket (OOP) medical expenditures conditional on having 
IPI. Instead, descriptive results of the impacts on premiums and OOP medical expenditures are 
presented. Figures 3.6 and 3.7 graphically present the average non-zero log premiums and log 
OOP spending for IPI-covered individuals before and after the exchanges and incentives went 
into effect in 2014, along with the local linear curves checking for discontinuities. These cost 
measures have not changed and are comparable across time, but are generally noisy. 
Figure 3.6 shows that IPI premium payers in 2014 had lower average log premiums than 
2010–2012 payers across the FPL distribution in both expansion and non-expansion states. For 
expansion states in 2014, the line is relatively smooth up to 250% FPL.  Premiums drop slightly 
after 250% FPL and then exhibit a larger drop-off above 400% FPL. The trend lines are smooth 
in non-expansion states in 2014. For both state groupings, the pre-periods do not show large 
changes near any of the cutoffs.  
 The increases in average log premiums just below the 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs in 
expansion states suggest CSR-maximizing behavior. Figure 3.7 provides suggestive evidence for 
this hypothesis. Log OOP expenditures are lower across time below 250% FPL, and then 
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converge back to pre-204 levels. This is suggestive of broader welfare benefits to consumers. 
There is also an increase in log OOP expenditures just below 400% FPL in expansion and non-
expansion states in 2014. This last fact could be evidence of adverse selection. The demographic 
stratifications in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 do not suggest adverse selection on the extensive margin, but 
the effects below 400% FPL are weakly suggestive of adverse selection on the intensive margin.  
Robustness Checks 
I implement a wide range of robustness checks and sensitivity analyses to attempt to 
refute the main results presented in the previous section. Results from the all robustness checks 
are summarized here. A selection of figures and tables for robustness checks are included in the 
Appendix and full results available upon request. The first robustness test involves arbitrarily 
moving the cutoff around the FPL distribution to create false cutoffs. The cutoffs near 138% or 
100% FPL, 250%, and 400% FPL should have the largest effect size in absolute magnitude and 
the largest test statistic. There are no other large effects in the FPL range around 138% FPL for 
IPI in expansion states. Just above 100% FPL in non-expansion states there is a large, positive 
effect (see Appendix Figure 8). Near 250% FPL and 400% FPL for IPI in both expansion and 
non-expansion states, the permutation test is not suggestive of false effects (see Appendix 
Figures 95 and 10). Among the ESI and PHI outcomes, the permutation testing do not alter 
interpretation of the main results at any cutoff. 
The second robustness test alters the bandwidth for the model, ranging from 25% FPL on 
either side of the cutoff to 100% FPL on either side of the three cutoffs. There is no robust 
guidance on the appropriate bandwidth to use with an RD design. Should the results be sensitive 
                                                 
5Appendix Figure 8 also shows that there are no effects associated with the CSRs at 200% FPL in expansion states 
and at 150% and 200% FPL in non-expansion states.  The CSR drops from 94% actuarial value to 87% actuarial 
value at 150% FPL and further drops to 73% actuarial value at 200 FPL. 
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to the bandwidth, it may cast doubt on the design. The results are appropriately sensitive to 
bandwidth selection (see Appendix Figure 11). Coefficient magnitude is at least constant or 
decreasing in absolute magnitude as the bandwidth increase.  
The third robustness test assesses non-random heaping. I assess bunching using 
disaggregated scatter plots across FPL ranges for each outcome and do not find evidence of 
heaping. 
The fourth and final robustness test examines potential effects of demographic shifts near 
the cutoffs. There is little visual evidence of demographic breaks near the cutoffs, but three 
demographic characteristics do have statistically significant differences in a few models: 
race/ethnicity, marital status, and family size. The proportion of non-white and Hispanic, not 
currently married, and average family size are noisy and decreasing in FPL in both expansion 
and non-expansion states, which help to explain why some models pick up a statistically 
significant effect. More importantly, the effects are small and there is no visual evidence of a 
demographic shift near any of the cutoffs. 
In summary of the four robustness tests, there is little evidence to draw serious concerns 
about the design. Beyond the robustness tests, these analyses still have several limitations. First, 
there are several potential sources of measurement error: statistically matched AGI, logical 
imputation of AGI to families, and projected versus actual income. It is assumed that these are 
cases of classical measurement error that magnified the standard errors and do not introduce bias. 
To check for sensitivity to AGI definition, I re-calculate AGI using the National Bureau of 
Economic Research TaxSim 9.0 program. Model estimates with the TaxSim version of AGI are 
slightly smaller in magnitude compared to the matched AGI definition results. The final source 
of measurement error—projected versus actual income—could not be addressed with the CPS. 
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Given the prospective incentives against cheating through repayment policies, the possibility of 
non-random measurement error is likely weakest in this study.6 
A second limitation is that the data do not directly measure receipt of tax credits and cost-
sharing subsidies or capture whether IPI is obtained through the exchanges. I assume that the 
cutoffs are binding and the demand for non-exchange coverage does not correlate with the ACA 
cutoffs. It is possible that non-exchange IPI coverage is wrapped up in the estimates. Built into 
this limitation is also the fact that the CPS income and HI questions were redesigned recently to 
better capture income and HI dynamics. Respondents could potentially confuse IPI coverage 
obtained through SBE exchanges or the FFE as PHI. As an anecdotal example, Kentucky and 
Colorado branded their exchanges as to not be associated with “Obamacare.” There may be some 
concern that the family size used in the FPL definition here exactly capture family size used in 
determining tax credit/cost-sharing eligibility. However, when the results are stratified by marital 
status in Table 3.5, the estimates are statistically indistinguishable. 
As a final limitation, while the CPS provides a large sample size overall, using only 2014 
data limits the relative sample size within FPL bins. The estimates could potentially be improved 
by additional years of data. The visual and statistical evidence support the main results of a 
combined effect, but more data is always better. In testing for income manipulation, I examine 
changes in labor market outcomes around the cutoffs. The null finding is consistent with other 
recent studies on the impacts of the ACA on labor markets (e.g., Gooptu et al., 2016). Given the 
precedence of income-based transfers affecting labor supply on the extensive and intensive 
                                                 
6 As noted earlier, individual retirement account contributions and other tax deductions/credits could be applied at 
the time tax filing to maintain eligibility.  Tax avoidance behavior cannot be observed here and is not critical to the 
research design.  Self-employed individuals are most able to manipulate income.  Separate analyses exclude self-
employed individuals and the results are not different.  
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margins (e.g., Bitler et al. 2006), short-term labor responses may not be detectable with 2014 
data alone, but should be monitored as more data become available. Future studies should 
examine whether long-term effects on labor market outcomes accrue. 
Discussion 
This analysis examines the effectiveness of ACA APTCs and CSRs implemented in 
2014. Overall, the APTCs and CSRs are not associated with sharp changes in any HI coverage at 
any cutoff in expansion states, but are associated with insignificant, positive changes in any HI in 
non-expansion states. For IPI, however, I find robust, positive effects of the combined 
APTC/CSR incentive just above 138% FPL in expansion states and weaker effects above 100% 
FPL in non-expansion states. This is a combined effect because consumers were initially eligible 
for APTCs and CSRs just above 138%/100% FPL. The APTC amount is highest and the CSR is 
most valuable at lower income levels, resulting in large effects where the incentives were 
strongest. Of particular policy importance is the finding that the increase in IPI in expansion 
states just above 138% FPL is offset by reductions in ESI and PHI.  This suggests a minimal 
level of crowd-out and could have significant implications for public health care expenditures.  
Despite the limitations noted in the previous section, the broad story painted by these 
estimates is a positive narrative of the initial effects of the combined incentive for lower income 
individuals. The difference in effect size and significance between expansion and non-expansion 
states also highlights previously identified coverage gaps among states opposing federal ACA 
policies. With a positive relationship between SBE adoption and Medicaid expansion, the 
difference in the effect between expansion and non-expansion states could indicate that outreach, 
assistance, and framing efforts of marketplaces could significantly affect uptake of IPI. SBE 
states funded consumer advocacy and outreach efforts to enroll eligible consumers, suggesting 
awareness of the SBE, the APTCs and the CSRs is likely to be higher (Sommers et al. 2015, Cox 
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et al., 2015). Furthermore, many expanding states directly referred individuals to the SBE when 
ineligible for Medicaid. Consumers in non-SBE states still had access to the FFE, but they may 
not have had the same access to information and assistance as the SBE states (Dash et al., 2013; 
Long et al., 2015). 
Tying into the broader literature examining the demand for health insurance, I estimate an 
elasticity of demand for health insurance of -0.65 to -0.58 for expansion states just above 138% 
FPL. This estimate is much larger than the -0.05 elasticity in Frean, Gruber and Sommers (2016), 
which is calculated using the average subsidy level (as in this study), but the treatment effect is 
for the broader 100-400% FPL population. Because the elasticity here is estimated on the margin 
of APTC and CSR eligibility, it suggests that low-income consumers on the margin are much 
more price-responsive than low-income individuals subject to the more gradual decline in the 
subsidy value.  
My elasticity estimate is also higher relative to the overall -0.38 to -0.27 elasticity from 
the ARRA subsidies in Moriya and Simon (2016), although they acknowledge that the ACA 
APTCs and CSRs could produce higher elasticities. Using a sub-sample of their data, Moriya and 
Simon (2016) estimate a similar treatment effect of 6.1 percentage points for the 138% FPL to 
400% FPL subsample, but the subsample elasticity of -0.41 is still lower than my estimate. One 
key difference between this study and Moriya and Simon (2016) is that their population consists 
of recently unemployed individuals. Recently employed individuals choose whether to maintain 
current coverage (with a 65% subsidy reduction) or lose coverage. Risk-averse consumers may 
be less price sensitive when faced with losing HI as opposed to a decision to become newly 
insured through the exchanges.   
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My estimate is at the upper range of the -0.6 to -0.3 elasticity estimated by Heim and 
Lurie (2009) for self-employment premium subsidies. Heim et al. (2015) estimate that the after-
tax exchange premiums (including the APTC) are on average 42 percent lower than comparable 
after-tax self-premiums paid by the self-employed, which may account for the difference in the 
range of the elasticities. In summary, the elasticity estimate of -0.65 to -0.58 just above the 138% 
FPL cutoff in expansion states is much higher than a similar study of the ACA (Frean, Gruber 
and Sommers, 2016) but aligns with other elasticities estimated among the self-employed and 
recently unemployed. 
While there are clear effects of the combined APTCs and CSRs in expansion states, the 
lack of robust findings at 100% FPL in non-expansion states is puzzling given the coverage gap. 
In expansion states, the difference from 137% FPL and 139% is fully subsidized coverage to 
highly subsidized coverage, whereas in non-expansion states, the difference is unsubsidized 
coverage at 99% FPL to highly subsidized coverage at 101% FPL.  In one sense, this could 
imply a much lower elasticity. I do estimate a similar effect size for IPI above 100% FPL for 
young adults, which yields an elasticity of -0.80 to -0.77.7 Alternatively, this could be related to 
technical issues with FFE and other navigation/awareness issues highlighted earlier in FFE 
states.   
Perhaps unsurprisingly, there is no detectable effect on IPI near the 250% FPL cutoff, 
above which consumers lost eligibility for the cost-sharing subsidies. At 250% FPL, the actuarial 
value only drops from 73% to 70%; a relatively small amount. The permutation testing by 
default tests the 150% FPL and 200% FPL cutoffs, where the drop in the CSR is more valuable.  
                                                 
7 The proportion of the sample below 100% with IPI is 0.073, indicating a 70% to 74% increase.  Based on a 2014 
report from ASPE, the average benchmark FFE monthly premium for a 27-year old with the second lowest silver 
tier plan was $214.  With a $20/month income cap at 100% FPL, the subsidy represents 90% of the total premium.  
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There are still no visible or statistical effects (see Appendix Figure 8). I caution that the null 
results at 250% FPL attributable to the CSRs do not suggest overall ineffectiveness. Referring 
back to Figure 3.4, the unconditional proportions with IPI between 138%/100% FPL and 250% 
FPL are higher than the 250%-400% FPL and the greater than 400% FPL samples. Rather, the 
results indicate that CSRs are not necessarily differentiable from the APTC and the suggestive 
evidence of an effect just below the 400% FPL cutoff, concentrated in SBE states, implies that 
the APTCs drive the results. Still, a basic policy implication from this study is that the APTC and 
CSR levels would need to be raised at higher incomes to induce more participation. 
The results from this study imply that the long-term impact for income groups above 
250% FPL could be minimal unless the individual mandate is binding or the relative value of the 
APTC/CSR subsidy increases due to overall premium increases. This analysis assumes 
negligible effects of the individual mandate penalty in 2014. After 2015, the penalty increases 
significantly. Because the mandate penalty is also on a sliding scale, higher incomes are much 
more susceptible to the increase in the penalty and future studies should consider whether the 
countervailing effects of the individual mandate penalty increase the appeal of IPI. Furthermore, 
as currently written in law, the APTC and CSR levels do not increase over time, but increases in 
marketplace premiums potentially increase the relative value of the APTCs since the caps are 
relatively flat across time. If there are not visible effects in this design just below 250% FPL and 
only weak effects below 400% FPL in 2014, the increased mandate penalty in 2015 could be 
further re-enforced by the price increases in the marketplace to increase the attractiveness of 
exchange plans, creating effects beyond 2014.  The dynamic responses to these changes hinges 
on consumer awareness of and response to the individual mandate and premium increases.  
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Tables 
Table 3.1. ACA program eligibility 
FPL Range 
Cost-Sharing 
Subsidies 
Premium Tax 
Credits 
Expanded Medicaid 
Eligibility 
0–99% N N Ya 
100–138% Y Y Ya 
138–250% Y Y N 
251–400% N Y N 
>400% N N N 
aOnly applies to 28 states that expanded their Medicaid program.   
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Table 3.2. Weighted summary statistics 
 Expansion States  Non-Expansion States 
 68-208% FPL  
180-320% 
FPL  
330-470% 
FPL  68-208% FPL  
180-320% 
FPL  
330-470% 
FPL 
 N=8,575  N=7,417  N=5,939  N=6,351  N=6,590  N=4,826 
Characteristic Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE 
Any Health Insurance 0.79 (0.005)   0.88 (0.004)   0.95 (0.003)   0.65 (0.007)   0.83 (0.006)   0.93 (0.004) 
Any IPI 0.11 (0.004)   0.10 (0.004)   0.07 (0.004)   0.12 (0.005)   0.08 (0.004)   0.08 (0.005) 
Any ESI 0.46 (0.006)   0.71 (0.006)   0.86 (0.005)   0.38 (0.007)   0.70 (0.007)   0.81 (0.007) 
Any public insurance 0.23 (0.005)   0.07 (0.003)   0.03 (0.003)   0.15 (0.005)   0.05 (0.003)   0.04 (0.003) 
Age 42.58 (0.144)   43.50 (0.156)   44.53 (0.169)   42.08 (0.169)   43.63 (0.161)   44.75 (0.186) 
Female 0.53 (0.006)   0.50 (0.007)   0.49 (0.008)   0.55 (0.007)   0.50 (0.007)   0.49 (0.008) 
Race                                   
White 0.75 (0.005)   0.79 (0.006)   0.83 (0.006)   0.72 (0.007)   0.77 (0.006)   0.82 (0.006) 
Black 0.12 (0.004)   0.10 (0.004)   0.07 (0.004)   0.22 (0.006)   0.17 (0.005)   0.12 (0.006) 
Other/multiple race 0.13 (0.004)   0.11 (0.004)   0.10 (0.004)   0.07 (0.004)   0.06 (0.004)   0.05 (0.004) 
Hispanic 0.32 (0.006)   0.20 (0.005)   0.10 (0.004)   0.27 (0.006)   0.17 (0.005)   0.10 (0.005) 
 
Marital Status 
    
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
Currently married 0.52 (0.006)   0.58 (0.007)   0.70 (0.007)   0.48 (0.007)   0.61 (0.007)   0.74 (0.008) 
Previously married 0.19 (0.005)   0.18 (0.005)   0.13 (0.005)   0.25 (0.006)   0.20 (0.006)   0.14 (0.006) 
Never married 0.29 (0.006)   0.25 (0.006)   0.17 (0.006)   0.28 (0.007)   0.19 (0.006)   0.12 (0.006) 
Household Size 3.30 (0.023)   2.93 (0.022)   2.81 (0.021)   3.30 (0.026)   2.86 (0.022)   2.78 (0.023) 
Education                                   
Less than high school 0.18 (0.005)   0.08 (0.003)   0.03 (0.003)   0.22 (0.006)   0.08 (0.004)   0.04 (0.003) 
High school diploma/GED 0.35 (0.006)   0.32 (0.006)   0.24 (0.007)   0.36 (0.007)   0.33 (0.007)   0.25 (0.007) 
Some college 0.19 (0.005)   0.20 (0.006)   0.17 (0.006)   0.20 (0.006)   0.20 (0.006)   0.18 (0.006) 
Associate’s degree 0.10 (0.004)   0.13 (0.005)   0.14 (0.005)   0.10 (0.004)   0.13 (0.005)   0.15 (0.006) 
Bachelor’s degree 0.13 (0.004)   0.20 (0.005)   0.27 (0.007)   0.10 (0.004)   0.19 (0.006)   0.26 (0.007) 
Graduate degree 0.05 (0.003)   0.07 (0.003)   0.14 (0.005)   0.03 (0.003)   0.07 (0.004)   0.13 (0.006) 
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 Expansion States  Non-Expansion States 
 68-208% FPL  
180-320% 
FPL  
330-470% 
FPL  68-208% FPL  
180-320% 
FPL  
330-470% 
FPL 
 N=8,575  N=7,417  N=5,939  N=6,351  N=6,590  N=4,826 
Characteristic Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE  Mean SE 
 
Self-Rated Health Status                                   
Excellent 0.23 (0.005)   0.27 (0.006)   0.30 (0.007)   0.22 (0.006)   0.26 (0.006)   0.31 (0.008) 
Very good 0.32 (0.006)   0.36 (0.007)   0.41 (0.008)   0.30 (0.007)   0.37 (0.007)   0.38 (0.008) 
Good 0.32 (0.006)   0.29 (0.006)   0.23 (0.006)   0.33 (0.007)   0.29 (0.007)   0.24 (0.007) 
Fair  0.10 (0.004)   0.07 (0.003)   0.05 (0.004)   0.12 (0.005)   0.08 (0.004)   0.05 (0.004) 
Poor 0.03 (0.002)   0.02 (0.002)   0.01 (0.002)   0.03 (0.003)   0.02 (0.002)   0.01 0.002  
Notes: Data are drawn from the IPUMS-CPS. Twenty-eight states expanded their Medicaid program by 2014. All means are weighted using the ASEC 
supplemental probability weights. ESI = Employer-Sponsored Insurance; IPI = Individually Purchased Insurance; FPL= Federal Poverty Level. 
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Table 3.3. Regression discontinuity estimates at 138% FPL/100% FPL, 250% FPL, and 400% FPL for HI outcomes, 2014 
  Expansion States   Non-Expansion States 
138% FPL     100% FPL     
N=8,429 Any HI IPI ESI PHI N=6,237 Any HI IPI ESI PHI 
Non- 
parametric 
0.008 0.054*** -0.013 -0.031 Non-
parametric 
0.043 0.023 0.026 -0.004 
(0.021) (0.017) (0.026) (0.021) (0.028) (0.019) (0.029) (0.020) 
Linear -0.006 0.048** -0.023 -0.032 Linear 0.034 0.022 0.017 -0.005 
(0.025) (0.019) (0.032) (0.024) (0.032) (0.021) (0.032) (0.022) 
250% FPL     250% FPL     
N=7,307     N=6,495     
Non-parametric -0.009 -0.013 0.002 0.004 Non-
parametric 
-0.039* 0.007 -0.034 -0.013 
(0.019) (0.017) (0.025) (0.012) (0.023) (0.015) (0.027) (0.011) 
Linear -0.011 -0.016 0.002 0.003 Linear -0.036 0.012 -0.042 -0.006 
(0.021) (0.020) (0.029) (0.014) (0.030) (0.018) (0.034) (0.014) 
400% FPL     400% FPL     
N=5,864     N=4,784     
Non- 
parametric 
0.010 0.011 -0.002 0.004 Non-
parametric 
-0.018 -0.005 -0.009 -0.003 
(0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.010) (0.017) (0.020) (0.027) (0.013) 
Linear 0.008 0.013 -0.003 -0.002 Linear -0.021 -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.027) (0.013) (0.020) (0.024) (0.032) (0.015) 
Notes: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Twenty-eight states expanded their Medicaid program by 2014. IPI = directly 
purchased private insurance. Observations within 70% on either side of the cutoff are included. Standard errors are in parentheses. Non-parametric RD is 
calculated using a triangle kernel. Standard errors are clustered on FPL. Each OLS model includes the cutoff indicator interacted with FPL. Models are weighted 
using the ASEC supplement probability weights. Covariates include age, gender, race, marital status, family size, education level, self-reported health status, 
MSA status, and state fixed effects. 
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Table 3.4. RD estimates for expansion states at 138% FPL by key demographics, 2014 
  Any HI IPI ESI PHI 
138% FPL N 
Non-
parametric Linear 
Non-
parametric Linear 
Non-
parametric Linear 
Non-
parametric Linear 
Marital Status 
 
              
Currently 
married 
4,590 0.025 0.005 0.055** 0.054* 0.034 0.010 -0.062** -0.059 
  (0.026) (0.032) (0.022) (0.029) (0.034) (0.042) (0.029) (0.037) 
Not married 3,839 -0.010 -0.014 0.053** 0.046* -0.066* -0.054 0.005 -0.006 
    (0.033) (0.034) (0.026) (0.026) (0.040) (0.041) (0.029) (0.028) 
Heath Status                   
Excellent/ 
very good 
4,568 -0.007 -0.010 0.053** 0.058** -0.052 -0.061 -0.013 -0.007 
 (0.028) (0.029) (0.025) (0.027) (0.035) (0.039) (0.026) (0.030) 
Good/fair/poor 3,861 0.022 -0.008 0.053** 0.040 0.021 0.017 -0.049 -0.066* 
    (0.031) (0.035) (0.023) (0.026) (0.038) (0.042) (0.033) (0.037) 
Age Group                   
26–39 3,830 0.057* 0.042 0.047** 0.036 0.006 -0.006 0.006 0.012 
  (0.032) (0.034) (0.024) (0.025) (0.039) (0.043) (0.032) (0.036) 
40–64 4,599 -0.031 -0.040 0.061** 0.058** -0.030 -0.028 -0.061** -0.070** 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.024) (0.027) (0.035) (0.040) (0.028) (0.032) 
Notes: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Twenty-eight states expanded their Medicaid program by 2014. IPI = directly 
purchased private insurance. Observations within 70% on either side of the cutoff are included. Standard errors are in parentheses. Non-parametric RD is 
calculated using a triangle kernel. Standard errors are clustered on FPL. Each OLS model includes the cutoff indicator interacted with FPL. Models are weighted 
using the ASEC supplement probability weights. Covariates include age, gender, race, marital status, family size, education level, self-reported health status, 
MSA status, and state fixed effects. 
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Table 3.5. RD Estimates for non-expansion states at 100% FPL by key demographics, 2014 
    Any HI IPI ESI PHI 
100% FPL N Non-
parametric Linear 
Non-
parametric Linear 
Non-
parametric Linear 
Non-
parametric Linear 
Marital Status          
Currently 
Married 
3,134 0.062 0.040 0.021 0.031 0.024 -0.006 0.019 0.016 
  (0.041) (0.044) (0.029) (0.035) (0.040) (0.048) (0.030) (0.037) 
Not Married 3,103 0.034 0.026 0.024 0.015 0.040 0.034 -0.029 -0.023 
    (0.040) (0.044) (0.027) (0.026) (0.041) (0.040) (0.026) (0.026) 
Heath Status             
Excellent/ 
Very Good 
3,294 0.090** 0.065 0.039 0.029 0.050 0.034 0.003 0.002 
  (0.038) (0.041) (0.027) (0.030) (0.040) (0.042) (0.025) (0.028) 
Good/Fair/Poor 2,943 -0.011 0.005 0.006 0.011 0.001 -0.001 -0.015 -0.005 
    (0.042) (0.043) (0.028) (0.028) (0.040) (0.045) (0.031) (0.034) 
Age Group             
26–39 2,988 0.061 0.064 0.051** 0.053** 0.031 0.028 -0.020 -0.017 
  (0.042) (0.045) (0.022) (0.025) (0.043) (0.046) (0.027) (0.030) 
40–64 3,249 0.026 0.013 -0.003 -0.004 0.022 0.002 0.007 0.015 
  (0.038) (0.040) (0.031) (0.033) (0.040) (0.043) (0.029) (0.030) 
Notes: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Thirty-two states had not expanded their Medicaid program as of 2014.  IPI = directly 
purchased private insurance. Observations within 70% on either side of the cutoff are included. Standard errors are in parentheses. Non-parametric RD is 
calculated using a triangle kernel. Standard errors are clustered on FPL. Each OLS model includes the cutoff indicator interacted with FPL. Models are weighted 
using the ASEC supplement probability weights. Covariates include age, gender, race, marital status, family size, education level, self-reported health status, 
MSA status, and state fixed effects. 
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Figures 
Figure 3.1. FPL density estimates, post- and pre-2014 
Panel A. Expansion States 
 
 
Panel B. Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Bars represent a 10% FPL bin. Vertical lines represent the 138%/100%, 
250% and 400% FPL cutoffs.  
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Figure 3.2. Any HI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2014 
Panel A. Expansion States 
 
Panel B. Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Figure 3.3. IPI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2014 
Panel A. Expansion States 
 
Panel B. Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Figure 3.4. ESI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2014 
Panel A. Expansion States 
 
Panel B. Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Figure 3.5. PHI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2014 
Panel A. Expansion States 
 
Panel B. Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Figure 3.6. Log non-zero HI premiums for IPI-covered individuals in 2014 
Panel A. Expansion States 
 
Panel B. Non-expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250%, and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Figure 3.7. Log OOP expenditures for IPI-covered individuals in 2014 
Panel A. Expansion States 
 
Panel B. Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250%, and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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CHAPTER 4: DISENTANGLING THE EFFECTS OF EMPLOYER-SPONSORED 
HEALTH INSURANCE ON THE U.S. EARNINGS DISTRIBUTION 
Introduction 
Unlike nearly every other developed country, health insurance in the United States 
remains ostensibly tied to employment for the nonelderly population. Almost 60% of the U.S. 
population remains covered by employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) (DeNavas et al., 
2009). Reliance on ESI is thought to have several consequences in the labor market. 
Compensating earnings differentials suggest increases in ESI costs should put downward 
pressure on earnings. Empirical evidence for an earnings penalty, however, is mixed, with many 
studies finding positive or insignificant effects. This is especially puzzling given the large 
increase in premiums over the last three decades.  
Exploiting the large increases in ESI premiums between 1995 and 2007 using a 
difference-in-differences framework, this study shows how earnings growth changes for ESI 
policy holders (PH) both on average and across the earnings distribution. Drawing on 
methodological approaches from the earnings equality literature, I focus on changes between two 
years, 1995 and 2007, using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS). Studies of earnings 
inequality often focus on the changes in the earnings distribution across discrete points in time. 
1995 is the first year the CPS collects detailed health insurance information, and 2007 is the last 
calendar year before the Great Recession. Also, this period largely matches the existing estimates 
of the ESI-earnings penalty in the literature.  
 This study makes three contributions in understanding the ESI-earnings penalty. First, I 
provide evidence that both sample selection and selection bias have contributed to the mixed 
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findings in the literature. I comprehensively assess changes in demographics and earnings across 
full-time, full-year workers (FTFY), part-time or part-year workers (PTPY), and the combined 
sample of all workers (referred to as the FULL sample). Existing studies vary significantly in 
whether PTPY workers are included. Based on descriptive analysis, I find that the preferred 
model includes FTFY workers and compares ESI PHs to ESI dependents (referred to as the 
FTFY-ESI sample). Ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates from this preferred model indicate 
that increases in ESI costs over time are associated with a modest earnings penalty of 3%. I show 
that the FULL sample overstates the earnings penalty from increasing ESI premiums, yielding an 
estimate of nearly 10% that is consistent with almost full cost-shifting onto employees, similar to 
Baicker and Chandra (2006). I also examine the role of selection into ESI by using inverse 
propensity and entropy balancing weighting and find that weighting produces estimates similar 
to the FTFY worker sample. 
Second, I use quantile regression to examine heterogeneous effects of increasing ESI 
costs on earnings, moving beyond existing estimates of the average effects. For the FTFY-ESI 
sample, quantile models show that the earnings penalty is larger, approximately 5%, but applies 
only to earners below the 75th earnings percentile. When weighting methods are used, the 
penalty for the lowest quarter of the distribution dissipates, suggesting the penalty is 
concentrated in the middle half of the earnings distribution. 
Third, I estimate models that use a continuous measure of premiums, separated into 
employer and employee contributions. It has been assumed that the primary mechanism by 
which earnings are reduced is through employer contributions. Recent studies (e.g., Lubotsky 
and Olson, 2015) using firm-level data have suggested that the mechanism is instead increases in 
employee contributions. My results suggest that increases in employer contributions do have a 
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small, negative effect that applies to all earners, but that increases in employee contributions 
yield net positive effects on earnings growth for the upper 50% of earners. The offset for higher 
earners provides unifying evidence that is consistent with cost-shifting from employers to 
employees due to compensating wage differentials, but also shows that higher earners may 
benefit from increasing employee contributions relative to lower earners due to higher marginal 
tax rates. 
Background 
In the United States, nearly 60% of the population receives health insurance through an 
employer-sponsored plan (DeNavas et al., 2009). Generally, the employer and employee both 
contribute to the insurance premiums—there is a cost to the employer in the form of non-
pecuniary compensation, and there is a direct cost to the employee and a potential indirect cost 
through reduced earnings. From 2000 through 2010, the annual cost of an average ESI plan 
increased by more than 125%, and the contributions from employees to these plans increased by 
more than 150%, while nominal earnings increased by only 35% (Kaiser Family Foundation, 
2013).  
The trade-off between ESI premiums and earnings is theoretically grounded in 
compensating earnings differentials (Rosen, 1986). In a perfectly competitive labor market with 
no institutional constraints, employees who value health insurance would be willing to accept 
lower earnings in exchange for health insurance. Gruber (2000) notes two issues with health 
insurance that cause a departure from the traditional model: firms cannot necessarily set 
employee-specific health insurance packages, and firms face heterogeneous pricing for 
purchasing health insurance. These constraints may hamper job mobility among workers, who 
may prefer to retain current employment for a given firm’s ESI benefits than switch to a more 
productive, higher paying job with a different set of ESI benefits. In a seminal paper, Summers 
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(1989) argues that rising ESI costs will be fully shifted onto employees through earnings if 
employees value health insurance. In the context of the United States, this effect is reinforced 
through the non-taxability of ESI benefits.  
While microeconomic theory suggests that the large increase in the cost of premiums 
should lead to a reduction in earnings, the empirical literature has not robustly confirmed this 
prediction (Currie & Madrian, 1999). Focusing on mandated ESI benefits at the state level, the 
earliest studies find that the costs of mandated benefits are shifted onto groups targeted by the 
mandate (e.g., Gruber & Krueger, 1991; Gruber, 1994). Most pre-2000 studies, however, 
produce moderate-to-small effect sizes with weak identification strategies (Currie & Madrian, 
1999). 
 The common empirical model of the ESI-earnings gap starts with the Mincer equation: 
ln(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (1) 
where ln(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡) are log pre-tax, pre-transfer annual earnings for person i at year t; 𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 is 
a measure of ESI; and 𝑋𝑖 is a vector of demographic, human capital, and geographic 
characteristics. 𝛽1 is the reduced form wage return to having ESI. The identification of 𝛽1 has 
been proposed in the literature through three estimation methods: difference-in-differences (DD) 
(relying on a control group), fixed effects (relying on time invariant unobserved heterogeneity), 
and instrumental variables (relying on exogeneity assumptions) (Currie & Madrian. 1999). None 
of these approaches directly address selection bias. 
In addition to identification, the measure of ESI is not consistent across studies, including 
both binary measures of ESI and continuous premium contributions. Across both measures, a 
persistent issue is the accounting of the referent group. For the binary measure of ESI, 
permutations of the referent group could be ESI dependents, those without ESI, those with non-
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group insurance, or those uninsured. The operationalization of ESI itself, therefore, may be 
endogenous or could influence the estimates.  
Recent studies have attempted to address this empirical deficiency. For example, Baicker 
& Chandra (2006) find substantial negative effects of employer premium contributions on 
earnings using instrumental variables (IV). They are limited by the use of imputed premiums and 
weak instruments. Qin and Chernew (2014) focus on public workers in the CPS, exploiting how 
public unions can affect the government’s ability to adjust wages and benefits. Using inverse 
propensity weight matching to adjust for differences and selection among workers with and 
without ESI, they find moderate but imprecise evidence of a penalty. 
Lluis and Abraham (2013) is the only study that explicitly models for selection into ESI, 
using panel data from the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS). Using a generalized 
methods of moments approach, they find weak evidence of an ESI-wage gap, concentrated 
largely among employees who have ESI and no other fringe benefits (e.g., pension or retirement 
plan). They find a positive earnings return to ESI when other fringe benefits are accounted for, 
suggesting the effects of increasing ESI costs may be spread across other fringe benefits. 
Employees may be willing to accept lower non-ESI benefits to account for increasing ESI costs.  
Other studies, such as DeVaro and Maxwell (2014) and Lubotsky and Olsen (2015), 
point to specific empirical concerns using narrower administrative data sets. DeVaro and 
Maxwell (2014) note that firm size is a critical determinant of insurance pricing and that the 
existing literature does not adequately control for firm size. They find evidence of a negative gap 
when firm size is interacted with ESI status in sample of California firms. Beyond firm size, they 
develop a model that separates multi-establishment firms from single establishment firms. 
Whereas a given establishment can set earnings according to local labor market conditions, 
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health insurance decisions are often made at the firm level. Firms may be constrained across 
establishments in passing along the premium costs. Still, they show an earnings penalty exists 
across both multi-establishment and single establishment firms. Lubotsky and Olsen (2015) use 
detailed administrative data for Illinois public schools to assess the relationship between 
employee premium contributions and earnings. They find no evidence that increases in total 
premium costs reduce earnings. Rather, increases in premiums are passed on in the form of 
employee premium contributions.  
Lastly, a study by Cowan and Schwab (2016) using difference-in-differences-in-
differences (DDD) suggests that given higher average medical costs, females face an earnings 
penalty through ESI coverage. This study uses a standard Heckman selection model as a 
robustness check and focuses on a narrow sample from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey 
of Youth (NLSY).  
Across this broad literature, all studies examine the average effects of ESI; no studies 
have focused on the distributional effects. Lubotsky and Olsen (2015) come close by stratifying 
their models across skill levels and find negative earnings effects concentrated among low- and 
middle-skilled workers, with no effects in the highest skill category. The focus on the average in 
this literature is in stark contrast to a separate but related literature that has emerged over the last 
decade focusing on measures of disposable income inequality. Disposable income is similar in 
nature to the Haig-Simons measure of economic income. The Haig-Simons measure includes 
consumption plus change in net worth. The following equation describes three broad components 
included in the measure of disposable income: 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑠𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 = [1 − 𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒)] ∗ 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
+ 𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐 𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑠 + 𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝐼𝑛 − 𝐾𝑖𝑛𝑑 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑠   (2) 
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Total income comprises earnings, which is wage and salary income, and unearned private 
income, including non-labor income sources and private transfers. Due to taxes, only a share of 
total income is included in disposable income. The tax rate, however, is endogenous to the 
income level. Disposable income also includes the value of public transfer payments and in-kind 
benefits to incorporate all financial resources available to an individual or family. The latter two 
benefits are not included in taxable earnings.  
Rather than include health insurance on the right-hand side of the estimating equation, the 
disposable income measure includes the value of health insurance as a part of the dependent 
variable. Chung (2003) and Pierce (2001) first examined this with a measure of compensation 
inequality (fringe benefits, but no transfers), and, more recently, an emerging literature has added 
transfers and a valuation of public health insurance. Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon (2012, 
2013) and Kaestner and Lubotsky (2016) show that including the value of public health 
insurance and transfers greatly reduces disposable income inequality. They also document a 
large gain in the upper income tail due to the tax benefits of ESI when accounting for post-tax 
income.  
However, the disposable income measure aggregates individual incomes to family, 
household, or tax units thus incorporating information on workers partially attached to the labor 
force. Most of the findings in the ESI-earnings literature are based on a FTFY worker sample, 
and identification concerns become more muddled once aggregating to a higher unit of 
observation that includes part-time or part-year workers. This study provides a link between pre-
tax earnings and post-tax, post transfer disposable earnings by highlighting the role of sample 
selection and selection bias before aggregation and points to potential mechanisms related to the 
U.S. tax system as a source of the earnings penalty associated with increasing premiums. 
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Referring back to Equation 2, ESI affects disposable income through three possible 
mechanisms: in-kind benefits, total earnings, and the tax rate. First, ESI provides a nontaxable, 
in-kind benefit that increases disposable income. Second, earnings could be affected directly 
through employee contributions to ESI and indirectly through employer contributions. This 
second mechanism is the focus of this study. Employment contracts are negotiated on pre-tax 
terms and contributions to ESI are determined annually. The employee portion directly reduces 
the salary or wage earnings, and if there is a gap between earnings and employer contributions, 
then total earnings could be reduced through lower salaries or wages if employer contributions 
rise. The latter, indirect mechanism is predominately studied.  
Third, employers could offset increases in their portion by increasing employee 
contributions, alleviating the downward pressure on earnings growth. Thus, the earnings gap 
could be positively correlated with increasing employee contributions. This consideration is 
critical when investigating the final mechanism, the tax rate. The tax rate is endogenous to total 
earnings, and reductions in total earnings could lower the tax liability. At higher tax liabilities, 
reductions in earnings are potentially appealing and could increase post-tax disposable income, 
as suggested in Kaestner and Lubotsky (2016). 
Data 
The CPS Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASEC) is the primary data set for 
this study, as it provides measures of both income and insurance status. I focus on the changes 
between two years, 1995 and 2007. Descriptive trends include all years, but model estimates 
include 1995 and 2007 only. The sample excludes veterans, self-employed individuals, work-
disabled individuals, and individuals younger than age 16 and older than age 64. I also exclude 
workers who reported zero weeks of work or reported being a family worker.  
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A common approach in the earnings inequality and earnings-ESI literatures is to restrict 
the analytic samples to FTFY workers. Full-time work means working 35 or more hours per 
week and full-year workers work at least 40 weeks. FTFY workers are the primary sample, but I 
also examine two other samples: PTPY and FULL. All workers (FULL) include FTFY and 
PTPY workers. I examine each of the three samples to describe the sensitivity of the model 
estimates to the inclusion of PTPY workers. FTFY workers are more likely to have higher 
earnings and more likely to have ESI. Thus, the effect of increasing premiums may differ by 
FTFY and PTPY workers, and the amalgamation of FTFY and PTPY workers creates a 
fundamentally different earnings distribution than in the subsamples. 
The dependent variable is the logarithm of pre-tax, pre-transfer individual earnings from 
all jobs. Earnings include salary and wage income and excludes all other sources of unearned 
income, such as rent or private transfers. All earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars using the 
Consumer Price Index.  
The primary independent variable is ESI, measured as either a binary indicator or a 
continuous measure of premium contributions. For the binary definition, I compare ESI primary 
policy holders (ESI PH) to one of two potential referent groups: ESI dependents and all else. The 
referent group for ESI PHs is not consistently defined in the literature. ESI dependents are 
covered by another household members’ ESI plan. The “all else” group includes ESI dependents 
and individuals without ESI. Individuals without ESI may have individually-purchased insurance 
(IPI) or public health insurance, or be uninsured. All insurance categories are mutually exclusive 
with the following hierarchy: ESI PH, ESI dependent, and does not have ESI. 
As an alternative to a binary measure, I impute premium contributions and employee 
premium contributions by replicating the method used in Burkhauser, Larrimore, and Simon 
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(2013). I start with state-level estimates from MEPS for employee and employer premium 
contributions. Although ASEC contains a self-reported measure of employer contributions, it 
does not historically capture the employee portion. MEPS is therefore commonly used as source 
for premiums for pre-2010 studies using ASEC. However, using only state-level estimates yields 
a relatively tight premium distribution with little overall variation. To flatten the distribution, I 
use firm size-specific estimates for single and family plans. Per Burkhauser, Larrimore, and 
Simon (2013), I also use detailed occupation estimates from the National Compensation Survey 
Employer Costs for Employee Compensation Index to scale premium costs by occupation type. 
All contributions are adjusted to 1999 dollars to match earnings, but are adjusted using the 
medical Consumer Price Index. Because the resulting premium distribution contains three mass 
points, I also include a binary indicator for non-ESI PHs to capture a mass point at zero in the 
premium distribution and binary indicators for whether the plan type is a single or family plan.  
Other included labor market characteristics are potential experience; education; job 
transitions; union status; and firm size, occupation, and industry fixed effects. Potential 
experience is calculated by subtracting from the individual’s age their years of education plus six 
(Autor et al., 2008). Individuals with negative potential experience or potential experience 
greater than 39 years are dropped. Job transitions are measured with an indicator for working for 
more than on employer during the year. Education is categorically assigned to six categories: less 
than high school, high school diploma/GED, some college, associate’s degree, bachelor’s degree, 
and graduate degree. Indicators for firm size (5 types), occupation (7 types), and industry (14 
types) are also included in all models.8 
                                                 
8 Firm size is broken out into less than 10 employees, 10 to 24 employees, 25 to 99 employees, 100 to 999 
employees, and 1,000 or more employees. Occupation types include management; professional; service; sales; 
office/administrative; natural resource, construction and mining; and production, transportation and material 
moving.  For 1995, the last two categories are combined into a single blue-collar occupation category. Industry types 
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Other individual characteristics of the sample include age and age squared, an ordinal 
measure of self-reported health status (excellent, very good, good, fair and poor), gender, marital 
status (married, previously married, and never married), household size, race (white, black, and 
other/multiple races), an indicator for Hispanic ethnicity, Census region (Northeast, Midwest, 
South, West), and an indicator for living in a metropolitan statistical area. State fixed effects are 
also included. All models are weighted using the ASEC supplemental weights, unless otherwise 
stated. 
Methods 
This study applies several empirical methods for assessing changes in the earnings 
growth associated with increasing ESI premiums between 1995 and 2007. The base approach 
uses DD and a standard OLS model, varying the analytic sample and referent group. I then 
directly address selection into ESI by incorporating inverse propensity weighting and entropy 
balancing methods. Finally, I use quantile regression to examine heterogeneous effects. The 
following sections describe the methods used for each approach. 
Difference-in-differences approach 
The DD approach is motivated by the earnings inequality literature that assesses the 
changes in returns to human capital and other characteristics at distinct points in time, capturing 
factors associated with earnings growth or decline. These studies focus on changes as time 
evolves and not specific policies or events. Thus, I estimate the changes in earnings across time 
for ESI PHs compared to non-ESI PHs: 
                                                 
are agriculture, forestry, fishing and hunting, and mining; construction; manufacturing; wholesale trade; retailed 
trade; transportation and warehousing, and utilities; information; finance and insurance, and real estate and rental 
and leasing; educational services, and health and social services; arts, entertainment, and recreation, and 
accommodation and food services; other services, except publication administration; public administration; and 
active military duty. 
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ln(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐼 𝑃𝐻𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽22007𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑆𝐼 𝑃𝐻𝑖𝑡 ∗ 2007𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (3) 
Equation 3 is a standard DD, relying on changes across time between the ESI group and 
the referent group to identify the effect of ESI on earnings. 𝛽1 measures the gap in earnings 
between ESI PHs and the referent group in 1995 (the “‘pre”‘ period), and 𝛽2 captures secular 
changes in earnings for the referent group in 2007 (or the “‘post”‘ period). 𝛽3 is the coefficient of 
interest, the change in the earnings growth over time. Given that ESI premiums have increased 
across time, compensating differentials imply that the coefficient 𝛽3 should be negative. As 
premiums increase, there should be an earnings penalty if employers are able to shift these costs 
on to employees. Also included in the model is 𝑋𝑖, a vector of demographic and work 
characteristics described above. 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is assumed to be a normally distributed random error term. 
As noted earlier, a challenge in identifying 𝛽3 (or 𝛽1) is that 𝐸𝑆𝐼 𝑃𝐻𝑖𝑡 is likely correlated 
with 𝜀𝑖𝑡, either through omitted variable bias, endogeneity, or selection. Although not a full 
solution to the identification issue, my approach attempts to address all three concerns. A key 
assumption in my approach is that ESI premium costs have increased for all potential employees 
over time, providing exogenous variation for a DD design. I rely on an extensive set of controls 
to minimize omitted variables bias. To address selection into ESI, I use inverse propensity 
weighting and entropy balancing methods. In combination, these may approximate conditional 
independence of 𝐸𝑆𝐼 𝑃𝐻𝑖𝑡 from the error term. 
For DD, the specific identifying assumption is that changes in earnings across time are 
not correlated with unobserved differences between ESI PHs and non-ESI PHs. In this context, 
the underlying counterfactual assesses how earnings change in the absence of increasing ESI 
costs. The validity of this assumption hinges on the definition of the referent group and analytic 
sample. Therefore, a primary purpose of this analysis is to document the sensitivity of estimates 
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of ESI-earnings penalty to the choice of the referent group and analytic sample. Given evidence 
in the literature, the FTFY sample is the likeliest sample to experience a wage penalty, but the 
choice of the referent group may affect the size of the penalty or even produce a wage gain. I 
argue that using ESI dependents as a referent group is the best strategy and that the FTFY-ESI 
sample that includes only ESI PHs and ESI dependents is preferred. FTFY workers that are ESI 
dependents are much more likely to be offered ESI but do not take it.9 They also implicitly value 
ESI by maintaining coverage. Thus, a plausible identifying assumption is that changes in 
earnings for ESI dependents across time are not correlated with increases ESI costs across time.  
A potential threat to the validity of this assumption is that increasing ESI costs affect the 
negotiation of earnings for ESI dependents. One could argue that, depending on the negotiation 
process, declining coverage could affect earnings and induce unobserved correlation across time. 
However, firms are often constrained to offering homogenous ESI packages and may have more 
flexibility in earnings adjustments. In that sense, if dependents are able to negotiate earnings 
increases by declining coverage, it provides the necessary counterfactual about how earnings 
grow in the absence of rising ESI costs. If there are more mechanical pressures, such that 
increasing ESI costs mechanically limit increases in earnings at a firm level for all employees, 
using ESI dependents as a referent group conditions out the mechanical component and offers a 
more unbiased test of compensating differentials. 
 Broadening the referent group to include FTFY workers without ESI is a slightly less 
desirable comparison. Individuals with IPI, public health insurance, or who are uninsured may 
not have an offer of ESI or may not value health insurance. They present an interesting 
hypothetical counterfactual. Without an offer of ESI, ESI costs do not factor into the earnings 
                                                 
9 The ASEC does not indicate whether respondents had an offer of ESI, so this is unobserved in the model. 
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decision. Likewise, if individuals do not value ESI, increases in premiums should not induce an 
earnings penalty through compensating differentials. However, these unobserved preferences for 
ESI could be correlated with earnings and potentially bias estimates of the penalty. Within the 
context of the FTFY sample, this bias could be minimal inasmuch as preferences for jobs that 
offer ESI or preferences to be uninsured do not change as premiums increase (i.e., individuals 
value an ESI offer or uninsurance more or less as premiums increase) or that changes in these 
preferences are weakly correlated with changes in earnings. 
 While the identification for the FTFY samples are more straightforward, the 
identification for the PTPY and FULL samples are less clear. An ESI offer is much less 
prevalent among PTPY workers, and the reasons or preferences for part-time or part-year work 
are unobserved. Comparing ESI PHs to ESI dependents among PTPY workers is not as clean a 
comparison as with FTFY workers, since PTPY workers may not be primary earners and jobs 
that are PTPY and provide ESI may be fundamentally different in earnings structure than PTPY 
jobs that do not offer ESI. Moreover, structural changes in the labor market associated with 
increasing ESI costs may shift workers to PTPY status. Once the referent group is broadened to 
include non-ESI PTPY workers, the selection issues are even more muddled. The impact of 
increasing premiums on earnings for PTPY workers is therefore interesting only in how they 
affect the FULL sample. There is not a strong argument that the DD assumption is valid for the 
FULL sample, and it is included to highlight the influence of sample selection and selection bias 
on estimates of the earning penalty. 
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Inverse propensity and entropy balancing weights 
 Estimating the earnings penalty for different samples and referent groups provides 
indirect evidence on the influence of selection. To directly address selection into ESI, I use 
inverse propensity weighting and weights derived through entropy balancing (Hainmueller, 
2012). Both methods control for selection on observable characteristics. Although I use a large 
set of covariates to model the selection process, the weighting methods require the strong 
assumption that unobserved characteristics are not correlated with the selection process. Given 
that I do not observe ESI offers or a comprehensive measure of the respondent’s health that 
would be related to ESI status, the method may not fully address the selection problem. 
Weighting methods, however, will reduce bias associated with selection based on a large set of 
observable characteristics, improving model identification. 
With longitudinal data, the standard approach balances the treatment and control groups 
at baseline and applies the weights to each subsequent time point. Since the sample is stable 
across time, balance should hold at each time period. This study does not have longitudinal data 
on respondents, which raises concerns about whether balance is maintained across time. With 
repeated cross-sections, respondents in the follow-up period could be different from the baseline 
sample due to changes in observable characteristics across time or due simply to random 
sampling of the population.  
In this study, four groups should be assessed for balance: (1) ESI PHs in 1995, (2) non-
ESI PHs in 1995, (3) ESI PHs in 2007, and (4) non-ESI-PHs in 2007. Starting with the inverse 
propensity weighting, I use a method recommended by Stuart et al. (2014) to ensure balance 
across these four groups by estimating three sets of inverse propensity weights and assessing 
covariate balance between the four groups for each set of inverse propensity weights. Covariate 
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balance across the four groups is assessed using a 0.1 standardized difference threshold for each 
covariate. The inverse propensity weights from the model that best balances covariates are used 
instead of the ASEC sampling weights in the regression models.  
The first set of inverse propensity weights are estimated with a logit where the outcome is 
1 if the respondent is an ESI PH in 1995 and 0 if they fall into the other three groups. I include in 
the model the all covariates described earlier plus FTFY status. This process treats ESI PHs in 
2007 as “untreated” for the inverse propensity weight estimation and includes both 1995 and 
2007 respondents in the untreated group. The second set of inverse propensity weights are 
estimated with two independent logits. First, I estimate a logit for the 1995 data with the outcome 
defined as 1 for ESI PHs and 0 for non-ESI PHs. Then, I calculate inverse propensity weights for 
the 1995 data. The same procedure is then independently applied to 2007. This process ensures 
balance between the treated and untreated groups within each year, but does not necessarily 
balance observable characteristics across time.  
The third set of inverse propensity weights is estimated with a multinomial logit with four 
categories. This last model is recommended by Stuart et al. (2014) since it addresses selection on 
observables across time and treatment condition. 1995 ESI PHs are the base category with the 
three remaining groups as the other outcomes. In a multinomial framework, each respondent has 
a predicted probability of being in each of the four groups. The inverse propensity weights are 
normalized to the base category, 1995 ESI PHs, such that: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 =
Pr (𝑌𝑖 = 1)
Pr (𝑌𝑖 = 𝑘)
 
where Y is the outcome for the group, i refers to the individual, k refers to the group the 
individual was in, and k=1 refers to ESI PHs in 1995. This approach produces a weight of one 
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for 1995 ESI PHs. The inverse propensity weights for the other three groups are proportionally 
weighted to likelihood of being a 1995 ESI PH.  
As an alternative to inverse propensity weighting, I also use weights derived through 
entropy balancing. Rather than rely on the functional form assumptions for estimating inverse 
propensity weights, entropy balancing uses a pre-processing algorithm to assign weights such 
that the control group is balanced across multiple moments (Hainmueller, 2012). The algorithm 
produces a similar weight for the control group as an inverse propensity weight, but always 
assigns a weight of one to the treatment group. Similar to the inverse propensity weights, I 
estimate three sets of entropy balancing weights to assess which set best balances the four 
groups. Since I cannot use a multinomial framework for the third set of weights, I independently 
run the entropy balancing algorithm three times to balance ESI PHs in 1995 again each of the 
three other groups. As with the inverse propensity weights, the entropy balancing weights from 
the preferred set are applied to the regression models. 
Quantile methods 
  A final alteration to the DD framework assesses heterogeneous effects on the earnings 
distribution using quantile regression. Conditional quantile methods estimate a coefficient that 
can be interpreted as a rate of return at different points of the earnings distribution. Buchinsky 
(1994) first suggested using quantile regression to assess changes in the conditional earnings 
distribution associated with the returns to education. The conditional quantile model is specified 
as such: 
𝑄𝜏[ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 |𝑍𝑖𝑡] = 𝑍′𝛽(𝜃) + 𝐹𝜀𝑖𝑡
−1(𝜏)    
where 𝑄𝜏[ln(𝑤𝑎𝑔𝑒)𝑖𝑡 |𝑍𝑖𝑡] is the conditional quantile function of log earnings given 𝑍𝑖𝑡, the full 
set of characteristics, and τ is used to denote a specific quantile. τ=0.5 would represent the 
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conditional median function. 𝛽(𝜃) is a vector of coefficients to be estimated. The additive error 
term used in the regression model is been replaced with 𝐹𝜀𝑖𝑡
−1(𝜏), the inverse of the cumulative 
distribution function for the loss function evaluated at quantile τ. This specification allows the 
parameters in the model to differ at each τ and accounts for a heteroskedastic error term (Angrist 
and Pischke, 2009; Cameron and Trivedi, 2010).  
Results 
Descriptive analysis 
This section comprehensively describes the characteristics and earnings trends of the 
different worker samples and highlights differences across the samples that may influence the 
size and direction of the ESI-earnings penalty. Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.1 
across the FTFY, PTPY, and FULL samples for the years 1995 and 2007. Mean earnings 
increase by approximately $5,000 for the FTFY and FULL samples between 1995 and 2007 and 
by approximately $2,000 for the PTPY sample. ESI PH coverage declined by 1 to 2 percentage 
points across all samples between 1995 and 2007. In the PTPY sample, the uninsured rate 
increases by 3 percentage points between 1995 and 2007. Across the three samples, real 
employer contributions increase by approximately 50% and real employee contributions increase 
by 65%. 
Tables 4.2 through 4.4 present detailed summary statistics for groups within the FTFY, 
PTPY, and FULL samples. Each table breaks the sample into ESI PHs, ESI dependents, and 
individuals without ESI, with the latter two groups representing the proposed control groups for 
the DD design. Starting with Table 4.2, FTFY-ESI dependents are more likely to be female, 
married, and work for a smaller firm compared with FTFY-ESI PHs. Otherwise, ESI dependents 
are naturally similar in observable characteristics to ESI PHs. Compared with ESI PHs, 
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individuals without ESI are younger; less similar in marital status; more likely to be Hispanic; 
less educated; more likely to work in a construction, service, or blue collar industry; less likely to 
work in professional service industries; less likely to be in a management or professional 
occupation; more likely to work in a service or blue collar occupation; and more likely to work 
in smaller firms. Individuals without ESI are approximately 80% uninsured. Table 4.2 suggests 
that individuals without ESI are much different from ESI PHs and may not serve as a good 
control group. 
Table 4.3 stratifies the PTPY sample across ESI PHs and control groups. Unlike the 
FTFY sample, there are demographic differences in the PTPY sample between ESI PHs and ESI 
dependents. ESI dependents are younger, less likely to be married, live in a larger household, 
have less potential experience, are less educated, work in different industries (most notably 
retail), more likely to work in sales or services occupations, and more likely work in a smaller 
firm. Substantial demographic differences exist between ESI PHs and non-ESI individuals as 
well. The evidence in Table 4.3 suggests that both ESI dependents and individuals without ESI 
are different than ESI PHs, limiting their potential as a control group in the PTPY sample. 
For the FULL sample in Table 4.4, the viability of ESI dependents as a control group is 
further lessened. ESI dependents are similar to ESI PHs in racial composition, but differ 
substantially across other demographic, family, human capital, and job characteristics. ESI 
dependents are much less likely to be FTFY as well. Individuals without ESI remain quite 
different on observable characteristics.  
The detailed summary tables suggest that ESI dependents are naturally similar to ESI 
PHs in the FTFY sample, while the PTPY and FULL samples do not yield an obvious choice for 
a control group. A priori, the preferred specification is the FTFY-ESI sample that includes only 
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ESI PHs and ESI dependents, matching the conceptual discussion in the methods section. To 
balance the groups more explicitly, Appendix Table 2 presents covariate balance checks for the 
three sets of inverse propensity weights. For each set, I present the standardized difference for 
ESI PHs in 1995 against the three remaining groups. Only the third set using a multinomial 
framework yields standardized differences across all covariates are less than 0.1 and is thus the 
preferred model.10 Appendix Table 3 shows covariate balance checks for each of the three 
entropy balancing weight sets, and again, the third set that balances ESI PHs in 1995 to the 
remaining three groups independently provides the best match.  
Trends analysis 
The next set of results focuses on the equality of pre-trends assumption for DD and the 
viability of using two years of data, 1995 and 2007, instead of the full panel of years between 
1995 and 2007. Figures 4.1 through 4.3 illustrate the broader trends between 1995 and 2012. 
Starting with health insurance coverage, Figure 4.1 describes trends across types of coverage. 
This figure shows that all groups have a relatively flat trend through 2007, after which coverage 
for ESI PHs and ESI dependents declines slightly and the percentage of uninsured increases. 
Nothing in the trends suggest that 1995 and 2007 are anomalous years, although more dynamic 
changes occur after 2007 due to the Great Recession. 
Figure 4.2 presents the real earnings trends across sample definitions. I also present 
earnings estimates from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for FTFY workers as a reference point. 
My FTFY real earnings trend is similar to the national estimates for FTFY workers from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics across the study period. For all study samples, earnings have a weakly 
positive trend across time with no obvious deviations across samples, though the slope of the 
                                                 
10 This model also meets the overlap condition for propensity score methods. 
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trend is slightly more positive for PTPY workers. The relatively flat growth in real earnings is 
consistent with the literature for the 1995–2007 time period (Autor et al., 2008).11 Across the 
samples, there are also large level differences in the trends, with FTFY workers’ earnings 
remaining much higher PTPY workers. Both the FTFY-ESI and PTPY-ESI subsamples have 
slightly higher earnings their respective samples that include individuals without ESI.  
Once the worker samples are broken out across health insurance status in Figure 4.3, 
several differences in earnings growth emerge. Panel A with FTFY workers shows small level 
differences across groups, but the level differences do not invalidate the DD design. ESI 
dependents have a slightly more positive trend than ESI PHs and individuals without ESI, but 
match well overall and likely satisfy the equality of pre-trends assumption. Figure 4.3A also 
shows the log premium trend across the study period.  The premium trend is flat from 1995 to 
1998 and then steadily increases through 2007. Comparing the premiums trend to the earnings 
trend, the ESI PH earnings trend flattens after 1999.  The timing of the trend flattening in ESI PH 
earnings correlates with the large increase in premiums, whereas the trend for ESI dependents 
does not change as premiums begin to increase in 1999. 
In Panel B for PTPY workers, the slopes of the trend lines match well across the three 
groups, but it appears that the choice of the referent group has less meaning for the PTPY sample 
given the almost identical earnings trend for ESI dependents and individuals without ESI. In 
Panel C for the FULL sample, ESI dependents have a slightly more positive trend than ESI PHs 
and individuals without ESI. This is in contrast to the FTFY and PTPY panels, where the slope 
                                                 
11 The flat growth in earnings between 2007 and 2012 is also consistent with Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates 
(for example, see https://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2014/ted_20140423.htm). 
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of the trend lines match well. The equality of pre-trends may not hold for ESI dependents in the 
FULL sample panel.  
In summary of the trends analysis, there are level differences in earnings between ESI 
PHs and non-ESI PHs, but the trends match well in the FTFY and PTPY samples, strengthening 
the validity of a DD approach. There is less evidence that ESI dependents make a strong control 
group for the FULL sample. Finally, there is no “policy intervention” in this study for which 
there is a true pre-period, but Figures 4.2 and 4.3 highlight that 1995 and 2007 are not anomalous 
in the context of broader earnings trends. 
Based on the descriptive and trends analysis, the FTFY-ESI sample is the preferred 
sample since it best satisfies the equality of pre-trends assumption and is naturally similar in 
demographic composition. The FTFY sample including individuals without ESI meets the pre-
trends assumption, but is less similar in demographic composition and is not as ideal as the 
FTFY-ESI sample. While the PTPY samples appear to meet the pre-trends assumption, the 
sample composition is unquestionably different between ESI PHs and non-ESI PHs. The FULL 
sample may not address either the pre-trends or sample composition concerns. 
Changes in the earnings distribution 
 Moving beyond average earnings, this next section graphically assesses differences in the 
earnings distribution between 1995 and 2007, highlighting where the different samples and 
groups experience changes in their respective distributions and where expected earning penalties 
might appear in the quantile models. Figure 4.4 describes the change in the log earnings 
distribution between 1995 and 2007 across the FTFY, PTPY, and FULL samples.12 Starting with 
                                                 
12 Appendix Figure 12 shows the actual log earnings at each percentile for each sample in 1995 and 2007, from 
which the differences are calculated. 
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the conventional FTFY samples, the earnings gains are roughly flat until the 75th percentile, 
where the earnings gains increase. The 90th percentile increased approximately twice as much as 
the 50th and 10th percentiles. These ratios are consistent with the earnings inequality literature, 
suggesting an increase at the top of the earnings distribution and compression in the middle 
(Autor et al., 200813).  
The shapes and patterns of the earnings gains in the PTPY and FULL samples are 
markedly different. The PTPY sample experiences larger growth in the lower 50% of the 
distribution. The gains are decreasing up to the 75th percentile, after which earnings growth 
increases again. Compared to the PTPY trend, the FULL sample has much higher growth in the 
bottom 10% with a steeper decline through the 50th percentile. While there are largely static 
earnings gains in the FTFY sample, the PTPY and FULL samples have much more dynamic 
growth patterns in the lower portion of the earnings distribution. This conclusion is itself 
noteworthy, as these two groups have not been well-studied in the earnings inequality literature. 
Breaking out each sample across ESI status, Figure 4.5 provides several further insights.14 
In Panel A for the FTFY sample, the ESI dependent profile is similar to the ESI PH profile, but 
shifted higher across the majority of the distribution, whereas there are fewer differences 
between ESI PHs and individuals without ESI. Since ESI PHs experience lower growth than ESI 
dependents over most of the distribution, this indicates an earnings penalty for ESI PHs relative 
to ESI dependents. Conversely, the PTPY sample in Panel B shows few differences in earnings 
growth across the distribution between ESI PHs and individuals without ESI and there are only 
                                                 
13 The FTFY plot close resembles Figure 4.11b from Autor et al. (2008) that describes changes in real earnings 
between 1990 and 2000. Appendix Table 4 also describes common earnings dispersion measures for every year 
between 1995 and 2012. 
14 Appendix Figure 13 shows the actual log earnings for each percentile for each sample in 1995 and 2007, from 
which the differences are calculated. 
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lower tail differences between ESI PHs and dependents. The difference in growth between ESI 
PHs and ESI dependents in the lower tail is positive and not indicative of an earnings penalty. 
In the FULL sample in Panel C of Figure 4.5, ESI dependents have a concave earnings 
gain profile that is much higher than ESI PHs. The ESI PH profile is relatively flat except for the 
tails, and the profile for individuals without ESI decreases across most of the distribution. For the 
FULL sample, ESI PHs have lower earnings growth than ESI dependents across almost the 
entire distribution and the difference is larger towards the middle of the distribution. Comparing 
ESI PHs and individuals without ESI, the difference is decreasing until approximately the 70th 
percentile.   
Figure 4.5 suggests that the sample definition influences the pattern and magnitude of the 
differences in earnings growth between ESI PHs and the referent groups. There is a relatively 
constant earnings penalty for ESI PHs in Panel A when comparing ESI PH earnings growth to 
ESI dependents, but among the PTPY workers in Panel B there is no evidence of an earnings 
penalty. With the FULL sample, ESI PHs experience lower growth than both ESI dependents 
and individuals without ESI and the magnitude of the difference changes across the distribution. 
Thus, it might be expected that the FULL sample yields more dynamic estimates from the 
quantile models with larger effect sizes than with the FTFY sample and that the PTPY sample 
yields little evidence of an earnings penalty. 
Conditional average and quantile difference-in-differences results 
The descriptive analyses in the previous section re-affirm that the FTFY-ESI sample 
including only ESI PHs and ESI dependents is preferred and that an earnings penalty may exist 
both on average and across the earnings distribution. This section now presents statistical 
estimates of the ESI-earnings penalty, starting with conventional OLS models for the average 
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effect and building to quantile models for heterogeneous effects across the earnings distribution. 
Table 4.5 presents OLS estimates for the binary (Panel A) and continuous measures of ESI 
(Panel B).  Although they are not the preferred samples, I include models with the PTPY and 
FULL samples to show the sensitivity of the estimates to the inclusion of PTPY workers. 
Across all models in Panel A, being an ESI PH in 1995 is associated with statistically 
significant higher earnings. The positive effect is much more pronounced in the less preferred 
PTPY and FULL samples, upwards of a 75% increase in earnings, relative to the roughly 25% 
increase in the FTFY samples.15 The binary DD coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant for the FTFY-ESI sample (~3% earnings penalty) and FULL sample (~10% earnings 
penalty). DD coefficients are not significant for the FTFY sample that includes individuals 
without ESI and for the PTPY sample. The last two columns of Panel A present the inverse 
propensity- and entropy balancing-weighted regressions to account for selection into ESI. The 
entropy balancing-weighted regression model estimates comparable effects to the preferred 
FTFY-ESI sample, while the inverse propensity-weighted model is somewhat similar in is 
magnitude but the DD coefficient is not statistically significant. Given the natural similarity 
between FTFY ESI PHs and dependents, it makes sense the weighting methods produce similar 
results to the second column of Panel A.  
For the continuous measures of ESI premiums in Panel B, the positive coefficient pattern 
for 1995 and negative DD coefficient pattern among the FTFY and FULL sample transfers to log 
employer contributions; however, the log employer contribution DD effect is only marginally 
significant for the FTFY-ESI sample. For log employee contributions, there is a negative initial 
                                                 
15 Coefficients from the regressions have been transformed by calculating 𝑒𝛽 − 1. For example, the coefficient for 
the FULL sample in the first row of Table 4.5 is 0.588: 𝑒0.588 − 1 = 0.80 
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effect in 1995 of approximately 3% in the FTFY and FULL samples and larger, positive, and 
insignificant effects across the models for the DD effect. The positive DD effect for employee 
contributions is marginally significant at the 10% level only in the model with the FULL sample. 
Although the positive effect is insignificant for the FTFY samples, it suggests that increases in 
employee contributions could mitigate the earnings penalty from employee contributions.  
The OLS results indicate a moderate earnings penalty of 3% for the preferred FTFY-ESI 
sample, but I cannot precisely decompose that effect across employer and employee 
contributions. Including both FTFY and PTPY workers in the model yields a much larger 
earnings penalty of approximately 10%.  When broken out by the type of contribution, the FULL 
sample yields a similar sign patter to the FTFY-ESI sample with higher magnitudes. While the 
standalone PTPY models do not yield an effect, their inclusion in the FULL sample appear to 
bias the estimate of the earnings penalty.  
The bias in the FULL sample earnings penalty is driven largely by an implicit interaction 
with FTFY status. Statistically, one might expect that the coefficient estimates for the FULL 
sample in Table 4.5 be a weighted average of the coefficients from the FTFY and PTPY models. 
Consistent with other studies (e.g., Baicker & Chandra 2006), the FULL sample does not include 
a control for FTFY status. Appendix Table 5 compares the coefficients for the FTFY, PTPY, and 
the FULL sample with and without the FTFY interaction.  Given the proportion that are ESI PHs 
are different across FTFY and that FTFY and PTPY earnings evolve differently, the final column 
of Appendix Table 5 shows how these influence the FULL sample and drive up the magnitude of 
the earnings penalty. FTFY ESI PHs have lower earnings (-0.345) and FTFY workers had lower 
earnings than PTPY workers in 2007 (-0.09). Once FTFY status is accounted for in the FULL 
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sample, the earnings penalty is back down to -0.02 and is consistent with the separate FTFY and 
PTPY models.   
Again, these OLS models estimate the average earnings penalty and do not inform 
whether the penalty is different for higher and lower earners. With the quantile models, the 
earnings penalty is assessed at different percentiles of the earnings distribution and the estimates 
are presented graphically. Figure 4.6 presents the DD quantile regression coefficients across the 
earnings distribution for the FTFY samples. Panel A for the FTFY sample that includes 
individuals without ESI shows a significant earnings penalty of approximately 3% between 25th 
and 75th percentile that is similar to the OLS estimates. The average effect was smaller and 
statistically significant, masking the larger penalty in the middle of the earnings distribution. At 
several percentiles in the tails of the distribution, the effect is positive but insignificant. For the 
preferred FTFY-ESI sample in Panel B, there is a relatively constant earnings penalty of 
approximately 5% up to the 75th percentile. The two panels look mostly similar except for the 
different behavior in the lower tail.  
Quantile DD coefficients for the PTPY samples are presented in Figure 4.7. Both panels 
show few statistically significant estimates. In Panel A, the DD effects are negative except for 
the tails and are statistically significant between the 60th and 80th earnings percentiles. The sign 
of the effect for the PTPY-ESI sample switches from positive to negative at the 30th percentile, 
but the only significant effects are around the 80th percentile. The relative lack of effects in the 
PTPY samples, regardless of whether individuals without ESI are included, is consistent with the 
minimal differences in the unconditional distribution in Panel B of Figure 4.5. Since the PTPY 
sample is not preferred, the null effects by themselves are not interesting, but are important to 
understanding the effects in the FULL sample. 
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For the FULL sample in Figure 4.8, the quantile effects in Panel A are much more 
dynamic and indicate a more severe earnings penalty in the lower tails. The earnings penalty is 
decreasing (in absolute terms) and ranges from 22% to 0. The penalty is much larger in 
magnitude compared with the FTFY models. Referring back to Panel C of Figure 4.5, earnings 
gains for ESI dependents and individuals without ESI are much larger than ESI PHs in the lower 
portion of the earnings distribution, which is the root cause for the increased magnitude of the 
earnings penalty. 
The increased magnitude of the earnings penalty in the FULL sample is influenced by the 
inclusion of PTPY workers, since these individuals have lower earnings and are less likely to 
have insurance (as noted in Table 4.3). When inverse propensity weighting is used (Figure 4.8B), 
the coefficients closely resemble the FTFY sample (Figure 4.6A) except for the bottom of the 
distribution where the DD coefficient turns positive. Likewise, the entropy balancing weights 
(Figure 4.8C) yield a graph similar to the FTFY-ESI (Figure 4.6C) sample with a relatively 
constant earnings gap of 5%. Comparing Figures 4.8B and 4.8C to Figure 4.8A shows that not 
controlling for selection into ESI may lead to an overstatement of the ESI-earnings penalty.  
When the preferred FTFY models are disaggregated by employer and employee 
contributions in Figure 4.9, there are again more dynamic patterns across the earnings 
distribution. In Panel A for the FTFY sample, there is a fairly static negative DD effect of 
employer contributions on earnings. For employee contributions, the positive DD quantile effects 
trend upward across the earnings distribution and are mainly significant in the upper 50% of the 
earnings distribution. The pattern across employer and employee contributions is mostly similar 
in Panel B for the FTFY-ESI sample. Figure 4.9 suggests a uniform, negative effect on the 
earnings distribution over time associated with increasing employer premiums, consistent with 
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cost-shifting. The positive effects of increases in employee contributions over time are 
suggestive of net-positive effect on earnings at the upper end of the distribution. Higher income 
individuals actually recover pre-tax and potentially post-tax earnings directly from cost-shifting 
through employee contributions due to the tax treatment of ESI costs.  
Finally, Figure 4.10 presents quantile coefficients of the effects of the continuous ESI 
measures on earnings for the PTPY and FULL samples. The PTPY samples show little DD 
effects across time for both employer and employee contributions. As with the OLS models, the 
FULL sample produces effects that are larger in magnitude than the FTFY samples, consistent 
with the other evidence presented in this section. 
Triple difference results using gender 
Building on an approach to study the gender earnings gap, a final set of models estimates 
DDD, with the third difference taken across females and males (Schwab & Cowan, 2016). The 
DDD equation is defined as follows:  
ln(𝐸𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡) = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 +
                𝛽5𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽7𝐸𝑆𝐼𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑂𝑆𝑇𝑖𝑡 ∗
𝐹𝐸𝑀𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽′𝑋𝑖 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡    (4) 
Schwab and Cowan (2016) argue that the effects of ESI on earnings should not vary across 
females and males over time except for the higher expected medical costs for females. I further 
examine this assumption here since the descriptive results show that FTFY and ESI status vary 
slightly across gender. The ASEC sample also includes a wider age range of workers than 
included in the Schwab and Cowan (2016) cohort in the NLSY79, which captures only older 
adults.  
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Table 4.6 presents regression coefficients from the DDD OLS models for binary ESI 
coverage (Panel A) and continuous measures of ESI premiums (Panel B). For the FTFY and 
FTFY-ESI samples in Panel A, there is a noticeable difference in the sign pattern of the DD and 
DDD coefficients. The FTFY sample has a negligible coefficient estimate (−0.002) for the 
difference across time, a marginally significant difference for female ESI PHs of −0.023, and a 
triple difference of −0.025 that is insignificant. However, the sign pattern reverses for the 
preferred FTFY-ESI sample, with a negative, marginally significant difference across time of 
−0.032 and positive and insignificant differences across females and for the triple difference. The 
FTFY model including individuals without ESI is indicative of a female ESI earnings penalty, 
while the preferred FTFY-ESI does not, highlighting the sensitivity of the results to the sample 
definition.  
The final three columns of Panel A in Table 4.6 focus on the PTPY and FULL samples. 
Unlike the FTFY and FTFY-ESI samples, there are not noticeable differences between the PTPY 
and PTPY-ESI sample in the sign pattern or significance. These two samples yield insignificant 
DD and DDD effects and the sign pattern indicates negative differences across time and for 
females, but a positive DDD effect. In the last column for the FULL sample, the difference 
across time of −0.091 signals a strong ESI earnings penalty, whereas the difference for females is 
positive and significant at 0.06, indicating that the female ESI PHs fair better than males. For the 
FULL sample, the negligible and insignificant DDD coefficient suggests little difference in the 
earnings gap associated with increasing ESI costs over time. In summary of Panel A, the gender 
earnings penalty appears in the FTFY, PTPY and PTPY-ESI samples, but the sign reverses in the 
FTFY-ESI and FULL samples, providing inconsistent evidence of a gender-specific penalty 
associated with ESI. 
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Appendix Table 6 replicates the actual specification in Cowan and Schwab (2016)—a 
DD comparing individuals with ESI to individuals without ESI and males to females for the 
years 1995 through 2007—to assess comprehensively the gender penalty in the CPS. I find that 
the FTFY sample including individuals without ESI produces similar results to the Cowan and 
Schwab analyses, but the FTFY-ESI sample produces robust positive effects for women, similar 
to the results in Table 4.6. Overall, my results suggest that the increases in ESI costs over time 
are not affecting earnings differentially by gender and cast doubt on whether increasing ESI costs 
can explain the gender earnings penalty. 
Moving a step beyond Cowan and Schwab (2016), Panel B of Table 4.6 uses a 
continuous measure of ESI premiums to break out employer and employee contributions.16 Three 
findings stand out. First, employer contributions introduce an earnings penalty, whereas 
employee contributions appear to help recover that penalty, matching the main results from 
Table 4.5 that do not incorporate a third difference. The first two rows of Panel B show that 
across models, the Log Employer Prem * 2007 coefficient is negative, and the Log Employee 
Prem * 2007 coefficient is positive. Here, the results are not significant except for the FULL 
model that is likely biased.  
Second, the middle two rows of Panel B show the differential effect of premium 
contributions for females. The coefficients are positive for employer premiums and negative for 
employee premiums, and these are significant in the FTFY, FTFY-ESI, and FULL models. 
Women may experience an earnings benefit through employer contributions; however, this does 
not entirely offset the personal contribution.  
                                                 
16 Appendix Table 7 replicates a DD analyses for the full 1995–2007 period. 
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Third, the DDD effects for employer and employee premiums in the last two rows of 
Panel B are small and insignificant. Women and men saw similar reductions in earnings over 
time due to increases in employer premiums. Increases in ESI costs for employers negatively 
affect earnings across time for both men and women, but it appears that the employee 
contributions may only affect women’s earnings. This is weakly suggestive that employee 
contributions may be a mechanism for the gender earnings gap discussed in Cowan and Schwab 
(2016). 
Discussion 
This study offers three contributions in understanding the earnings penalty due to 
increasing ESI premiums. First, I provide evidence that many of the null or positive effects found 
in the literature may in part be explained by the choice of the analytic sample and the reference 
group. In a preferred OLS model that uses only FTFY workers and compares ESI PHs to ESI 
dependents, I estimate a moderate earnings penalty of 3.1%. Including non-ESI workers reduces 
that effect size to a statistically insignificant 1.5%. Models focusing on the PTPY sample 
produce differing signs of the effect. When FTFY and PTPY workers are combined into a single 
sample, the estimated earnings penalty is 9.3%, three times the magnitude of the preferred 
model. The magnitude of my estimates for the FULL sample in Panel A of Table 4.5 aligns with 
the OLS and IV estimates from Baicker and Chandra (2006), who also use a FULL sample. They 
find that a 10% increase in premiums is associated with a 2.3% reduction in earnings and 
conclude that increasing costs are fully shifted onto employees. The real increase in premiums in 
my sample is 51% and, using the Baicker and Chandra elasticity, would predict a reduction in 
earnings of 11.7% that is similar my OLS estimate of 9.3%. I conclude that the FULL sample 
overestimates the magnitude of cost-shifting, and the preferred FTFY model produces less biased 
estimates consistent with a more moderate level of cost-shifting. 
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Second, this study also moves beyond average effects using quantile regression. Results 
from the preferred FTFY-ESI model estimates an earnings gap of approximately 5% below the 
75th earnings percentile. The average real earnings for FTFY workers grew 15% between 1995 
and 2007, meaning that the ESI earnings penalty was roughly one-third of overall earnings 
growth. This evidence is not consistent with full cost-shifting onto employees, but it is still 
economically meaningful. As with the OLS models, quantile models for the FULL sample 
estimate a much larger earnings penalty concentrated in the lower tail. This raises an important 
consideration for studies of disposable income that aggregate incomes within a tax unit or 
household and include PTPY workers. 
The third and final contribution of this study is to reconcile the differing mechanisms by 
which earnings are reduced through increasing ESI premiums. In decomposing employer and 
employee contributions, the preferred FTFY-ESI quantile model provides evidence of 
compensating differentials through cost-shifting and evidence that higher earners may not face 
an earnings penalty. My preferred quantile model estimates a small, negative, and static effect of 
increasing employer contributions on earnings across the entire earnings distribution. This 
negative effect is consistent with compensating wage differentials and cost-shifting and may 
simply be mechanical in nature. If employer contributions are growing faster than wage and 
salary pools, then earnings growth may stagnate. Conversely, employee contributions had a 
positive effect in the upper half of the earnings distribution, indicating that increases in employee 
contributions may offset the downward pressure from employer contributions. The offset for 
higher earners provides unifying evidence that is both consistent with cost-shifting from 
employers to employees due to compensating wage differentials, but also shows that higher 
earners may benefit from increasing employee contributions relative to lower earners due to 
 90 
higher marginal tax rates. The countervailing pressures of increasing employer and employee 
premiums are also an alternative explanation for the mixed evidence in the literature. 
Although the study period pre-dates the implementation of the Affordable Care Act 
(ACA), my results suggest that the ACA employer mandate could increase the earnings penalty 
among the lower and middle classes. Recent health reform efforts emphasize alternatives for 
those without access to ESI through public health insurance coverage via an expanded Medicaid 
program or through subsidized private coverage through state exchanges. Mandates require 
employers to offer ESI coverage and individuals to obtain insurance or pay penalties. Under the 
ACA, individuals receiving an offer of ESI are not eligible for public insurance expansions or 
subsidized exchange coverage, but are likely subject to the individual mandate penalty if they 
decline an offer of ESI. The individual mandate penalty may reinforce the decision to accept an 
ESI offer. Ultimately, the financial protection from health insurance could be beneficial for those 
who value or need it, but the earnings penalty may be reinforced or deepen existing inequalities 
in earnings. From a policy perspective, the earnings gap for lower- and middle-class points to 
unintended distributional implications of health reform, especially since the majority of the 
population remains covered by ESI. 
 Expansions of publicly financed coverage also emphasize the need for broader 
disposable income measures that may better reflect the welfare gains associated with having 
health insurance. The inconsistencies in the results for PTPY and non-ESI samples portend 
selection issues implicit in the disposable income literature, since these studies aggregate FTFY 
and PTPY individuals into tax or household units. A potential danger is that positive selection 
into public health insurance in the lower tail may overstate reductions in inequality associated 
with the inclusion of health insurance value in disposable income.  
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 This study has several limitations. First, the increase in ESI costs might not be entirely 
exogenous, and other methods, such as IV, may better address the endogeneity problem. 
Identifying a valid instrument, however, remains a challenge. To date, a single study has used 
medical malpractice claims as an instrument (Baicker & Chandra 2006). I examined the use of 
medical malpractice claims as an instrument for the current study and confirmed that medical 
malpractice claims are weak instruments. Even if a suitable instrument is identified, IV does not 
address selection unless the exogenous variation from the instrument strongly correlates with that 
selection. Although I do not incorporate a more generalized model of selection or address 
selection into employment itself, I do demonstrate the role of both sample selection and selection 
bias. Inverse propensity weighting and entropy balancing address selection into ESI based on 
observable characteristics, but it cannot address unobservable characteristics, which remains a 
limitation. 
Second, the earnings gap is measured using two years of data, and the year-to-year 
variations could produce different results. I argue that 1995 and 2007 are not anomalous years 
using a basic trends analysis of earnings and health insurance status. As a sensitivity analysis, I re-
estimate the models in Table 4.5 using alternating boundary years: 1995 and 2006, 1996 and 2007, 
and 1996 and 2006. These alternate specifications produce similar results. Third, premiums are 
calculated using an imputation process. Fourth, I cannot distinguish between single and multi-
establishment firms. DeVaro and Maxwell (2014) note that there is significant heterogeneity across 
these firm types. 
 Despite these limitations, this study makes progress in understanding the complex 
relationship between ESI and earnings. Future research should examine the post-tax implications 
of increasing premiums on earnings and the impacts on broader measures of disposable income. 
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Early studies of the ACA suggest that the labor market effects are minimal, but no studies have 
yet examined the earnings impacts. The distributional consequences of premium increases due to 
the ACA are an important, potentially unintended effect to the majority of the U.S. population 
covered by ESI and warrant careful monitoring. 
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Tables 
Table 4.1. Summary statistics 
                          
  FTFY PTPY FULL 
  1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 
  N=33,971 N=60,495 N=13,401 N=19,118 N=47,372 N=79,613 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Annual Earnings 34,163 (201) 39,210 (212) 10,288 (201) 12,405 (171) 27,445 (165) 32,928 (173) 
FTFY -   -   -   -   0.72 (0.002) 0.77 (0.002) 
Any Insurance 0.85 (0.002) 0.84 (0.002) 0.73 (0.004) 0.70 (0.004) 0.82 (0.002) 0.81 (0.002) 
ESI PH 0.71 (0.003) 0.68 (0.002) 0.24 (0.004) 0.23 (0.004) 0.58 (0.003) 0.57 (0.002) 
ESI Dependent 0.10 (0.002) 0.11 (0.001) 0.36 (0.005) 0.34 (0.004) 0.18 (0.002) 0.17 (0.002) 
IPI 0.02 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0.03 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 
Public 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.08 (0.003) 0.08 (0.002) 0.03 (0.001) 0.04 (0.001) 
Employer Contribution to ESIa 4,232 (13) 6,197 (16) 3,963 (37) 5,901 (49) 4,200 (12) 6,169 (15) 
Employee Contribution to ESIa 1,455 (6) 2,389 (8) 1,314 (16) 2,168 (24) 1,439 (6) 2,369 (7) 
Age 37.83 (0.064) 40.34 (0.057) 31.68 (0.121) 33.47 (0.120) 36.10 (0.059) 38.73 (0.053) 
Female 0.48 (0.003) 0.47 (0.002) 0.65 (0.005) 0.64 (0.004) 0.53 (0.003) 0.51 (0.002) 
Marital Status                         
Currently Married 0.60 (0.003) 0.58 (0.002) 0.43 (0.005) 0.40 (0.004) 0.55 (0.003) 0.54 (0.002) 
Previously Married 0.15 (0.002) 0.15 (0.002) 0.10 (0.003) 0.10 (0.003) 0.14 (0.002) 0.14 (0.001) 
Never Married 0.24 (0.003) 0.27 (0.002) 0.47 (0.005) 0.49 (0.004) 0.31 (0.002) 0.32 (0.002) 
Household Size 2.91 (0.009) 2.83 (0.007) 3.33 (0.016) 3.17 (0.014) 3.03 (0.008) 2.91 (0.006) 
Race                         
White 0.84 (0.002) 0.81 (0.002) 0.84 (0.004) 0.81 (0.003) 0.84 (0.002) 0.81 (0.002) 
Black 0.12 (0.002) 0.12 (0.002) 0.11 (0.003) 0.11 (0.003) 0.12 (0.002) 0.12 (0.001) 
Other/Multiple Race 0.05 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002) 0.07 (0.002) 0.05 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001) 
Hispanic 0.11 (0.002) 0.16 (0.002) 0.12 (0.003) 0.15 (0.003) 0.11 (0.001) 0.15 (0.001) 
Switched Jobs 0.13 (0.002) 0.10 (0.001) 0.23 (0.004) 0.18 (0.003) 0.16 (0.002) 0.12 (0.001) 
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Union 0.27 (0.003) 0.20 (0.002) 0.19 (0.004) 0.14 (0.003) 0.25 (0.003) 0.19 (0.002) 
Years of Potential Experience 2.86 (0.047) 3.48 (0.044) 2.50 (0.079) 3.06 (0.085) 2.76 (0.041) 3.39 (0.039) 
Education                         
Less than HS 0.11 (0.002) 0.09 (0.001) 0.23 (0.004) 0.18 (0.003) 0.14 (0.002) 0.11 (0.001) 
HS Diploma/GED 0.33 (0.003) 0.29 (0.002) 0.28 (0.004) 0.26 (0.004) 0.32 (0.002) 0.29 (0.002) 
Some College 0.19 (0.002) 0.18 (0.002) 0.26 (0.004) 0.26 (0.004) 0.21 (0.002) 0.20 (0.002) 
Associate's Degree 0.09 (0.002) 0.10 (0.001) 0.06 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) 0.08 (0.001) 0.09 (0.001) 
Bachelor's Degree 0.19 (0.002) 0.22 (0.002) 0.13 (0.003) 0.16 (0.003) 0.18 (0.002) 0.21 (0.002) 
Graduate Degree 0.09 (0.002) 0.12 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) 0.06 (0.002) 0.08 (0.001) 0.10 (0.001) 
Industry                         
Agriculture, Forestry,  
Fishing and Hunting, and  
Mining 0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.03 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.000) 
Construction 0.05 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002) 0.06 (0.002) 0.05 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001) 
Manufacturing 0.20 (0.002) 0.13 (0.002) 0.09 (0.003) 0.05 (0.002) 0.17 (0.002) 0.12 (0.001) 
Wholesale Trade 0.04 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.04 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 
Retail Trade 0.14 (0.002) 0.10 (0.001) 0.30 (0.004) 0.17 (0.003) 0.18 (0.002) 0.12 (0.001) 
Transportation and  
Warehousing, and Utilities 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 0.05 (0.001) 0.05 (0.001) 
Information 0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 
Finance and Insurance, and  
Real Estate and Rental and  
Leasing 0.08 (0.002) 0.08 (0.001) 0.04 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) 0.07 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001) 
Professional, Scientific, and  
Management, and  
Administrative, and Waste  
Management Services 0.07 (0.002) 0.10 (0.001) 0.07 (0.003) 0.09 (0.003) 0.07 (0.001) 0.10 (0.001) 
Educational Services, and  
Health Care and Social  
Assistance 0.20 (0.002) 0.22 (0.002) 0.23 (0.004) 0.25 (0.004) 0.21 (0.002) 0.23 (0.002) 
Arts, Entertainment, and  
Recreation, and  
Accommodation and Food  
Services 0.02 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002) 0.18 (0.003) 0.03 (0.001) 0.09 (0.001) 
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Other Services, Except  
Public Administration 0.03 (0.001) 0.04 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0.04 (0.001) 0.04 (0.001) 
Public Administration 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.05 (0.001) 0.05 (0.001) 
Occupation                         
Management 0.17 (0.002) 0.16 (0.002) 0.06 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0.14 (0.002) 0.13 (0.001) 
Professional 0.20 (0.002) 0.22 (0.002) 0.15 (0.003) 0.19 (0.003) 0.18 (0.002) 0.22 (0.002) 
Services 0.11 (0.002) 0.14 (0.002) 0.23 (0.004) 0.27 (0.004) 0.14 (0.002) 0.17 (0.002) 
Sales 0.10 (0.002) 0.10 (0.001) 0.16 (0.004) 0.15 (0.003) 0.12 (0.002) 0.11 (0.001) 
Office and Administrative  
Support 0.15 (0.002) 0.15 (0.002) 0.16 (0.004) 0.16 (0.003) 0.15 (0.002) 0.15 (0.001) 
Blue Collar 0.28 (0.003) 0.24 (0.002) 0.23 (0.004) 0.18 (0.003) 0.27 (0.002) 0.23 (0.002) 
Natural Resources,  
Construction &  
Maintenance -   0.11 (0.001) -   0.08 (0.002) -   0.10 (0.001) 
Production,  
Transportation &  
Material Moving -   0.14 (0.002) -   0.10 (0.003) -   0.13 (0.001) 
Firm size                         
Less than 10 employees 0.11 (0.002) 0.11 (0.002) 0.19 (0.004) 0.18 (0.003) 0.13 (0.002) 0.13 (0.001) 
10 to 24 employees 0.09 (0.002) 0.09 (0.001) 0.13 (0.003) 0.12 (0.003) 0.10 (0.002) 0.10 (0.001) 
25 to 99 employees 0.14 (0.002) 0.14 (0.002) 0.14 (0.003) 0.13 (0.003) 0.14 (0.002) 0.14 (0.001) 
100 to 99 employees 0.23 (0.003) 0.22 (0.002) 0.18 (0.004) 0.18 (0.003) 0.22 (0.002) 0.21 (0.002) 
1,000 or more employees 0.43 (0.003) 0.43 (0.002) 0.36 (0.005) 0.39 (0.004) 0.41 (0.003) 0.42 (0.002) 
Notes: aConditional on being an ESI PH. Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. Estimates are weighted using the 
ASEC supplemental probability weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI 
PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. IPI = Individually-purchased insurance. Full-time 
work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year.   
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics for FTFY sample by ESI status 
                          
  ESI PH ESI Dependent Non-ESI 
  1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 
  N=24,041 N=41,112 N=3,633 N=7,535 N=6,297 N=11,848 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Annual Earnings 38,275 (253) 44,401 (284) 28,284 (456) 35,471 (425) 21,626 (351) 24,066 (294) 
Any Insurance 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 0.20 (0.006) 0.22 (0.004) 
ESI PH 1.00 - 1.00 - -   -   -   -   
ESI Dependent -   -   1.00 - 1.00 - -   -   
IPI -   -   -   -   0.13 (0.005) 0.11 (0.003) 
Public -   -   -   -   0.07 (0.004) 0.11 (0.003) 
Age 38.77 (0.074) 41.50 (0.068) 37.89 (0.193) 41.45 (0.159) 34.18 (0.151) 35.85 (0.126) 
Female 0.47 (0.004) 0.47 (0.003) 0.64 (0.009) 0.60 (0.007) 0.43 (0.007) 0.41 (0.005) 
Marital Status                         
Currently Married 0.61 (0.004) 0.58 (0.003) 0.90 (0.006) 0.91 (0.004) 0.40 (0.007) 0.39 (0.005) 
Previously Married 0.16 (0.003) 0.17 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.20 (0.006) 0.17 (0.004) 
Never Married 0.23 (0.003) 0.25 (0.003) 0.09 (0.006) 0.09 (0.004) 0.40 (0.007) 0.44 (0.005) 
Household Size 2.82 (0.010) 2.71 (0.008) 3.47 (0.023) 3.38 (0.017) 2.97 (0.027) 2.91 (0.020) 
Race                         
White 0.84 (0.003) 0.81 (0.002) 0.87 (0.007) 0.85 (0.005) 0.79 (0.007) 0.77 (0.005) 
Black 0.11 (0.002) 0.12 (0.002) 0.08 (0.006) 0.08 (0.004) 0.16 (0.006) 0.15 (0.004) 
Other/Multiple Race 0.04 (0.002) 0.07 (0.001) 0.04 (0.004) 0.07 (0.003) 0.05 (0.003) 0.09 (0.003) 
Hispanic 0.08 (0.002) 0.11 (0.002) 0.08 (0.004) 0.10 (0.004) 0.22 (0.005) 0.33 (0.005) 
Switched Jobs 0.11 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) 0.15 (0.007) 0.11 (0.004) 0.19 (0.006) 0.13 (0.004) 
Union 0.29 (0.004) 0.22 (0.003) 0.24 (0.009) 0.18 (0.006) 0.22 (0.007) 0.16 (0.004) 
Years of Potential Experience 2.97 (0.056) 3.60 (0.054) 2.39 (0.121) 3.52 (0.127) 2.73 (0.118) 3.09 (0.091) 
Education                         
Less than HS 0.08 (0.002) 0.05 (0.001) 0.08 (0.005) 0.05 (0.003) 0.24 (0.006) 0.24 (0.005) 
HS Diploma/GED 0.31 (0.003) 0.27 (0.003) 0.37 (0.009) 0.30 (0.006) 0.38 (0.007) 0.38 (0.005) 
  
9
7
 
Some College 0.18 (0.003) 0.18 (0.002) 0.21 (0.008) 0.19 (0.005) 0.19 (0.006) 0.17 (0.004) 
Associate's Degree 0.09 (0.002) 0.10 (0.002) 0.10 (0.005) 0.11 (0.004) 0.06 (0.003) 0.07 (0.003) 
Bachelor's Degree 0.22 (0.003) 0.26 (0.003) 0.18 (0.007) 0.22 (0.006) 0.10 (0.004) 0.11 (0.003) 
Graduate Degree 0.11 (0.002) 0.14 (0.002) 0.07 (0.005) 0.11 (0.004) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 
Industry                         
Agriculture, Forestry,  
Fishing and Hunting, and  
Mining 0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) 0.04 (0.003) 0.03 (0.002) 
Construction 0.04 (0.001) 0.06 (0.001) 0.06 (0.004) 0.06 (0.003) 0.10 (0.004) 0.14 (0.004) 
Manufacturing 0.23 (0.003) 0.15 (0.002) 0.14 (0.006) 0.11 (0.004) 0.14 (0.005) 0.09 (0.003) 
Wholesale Trade 0.04 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.05 (0.004) 0.03 (0.002) 0.04 (0.003) 0.03 (0.002) 
Retail Trade 0.11 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) 0.17 (0.007) 0.12 (0.004) 0.25 (0.006) 0.13 (0.004) 
Transportation and  
Warehousing, and Utilities 0.06 (0.002) 0.06 (0.001) 0.04 (0.004) 0.04 (0.003) 0.04 (0.003) 0.05 (0.002) 
Information 0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.01 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01 (0.002) 0.02 (0.001) 
Finance and Insurance,  
and Real Estate and Rental  
and Leasing 0.08 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) 0.08 (0.005) 0.10 (0.004) 0.05 (0.003) 0.05 (0.002) 
Professional, Scientific,   
and Management, and  
Administrative, and Waste  
Management Services 0.07 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) 0.08 (0.005) 0.11 (0.004) 0.08 (0.004) 0.10 (0.003) 
Educational Services, and  
Health Care and Social  
Assistance 0.22 (0.003) 0.24 (0.002) 0.24 (0.008) 0.25 (0.006) 0.13 (0.005) 0.13 (0.004) 
Arts, Entertainment, and 
 Recreation, and  
Accommodation and Food  
Services 0.02 (0.001) 0.05 (0.001) 0.02 (0.003) 0.06 (0.003) 0.03 (0.003) 0.15 (0.004) 
Other Services, Except  
Public Administration 0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.05 (0.004) 0.05 (0.003) 0.07 (0.004) 0.07 (0.003) 
Public Administration 0.07 (0.002) 0.07 (0.001) 0.04 (0.004) 0.04 (0.003) 0.02 (0.002) 0.02 (0.001) 
Occupation                         
Management 0.19 (0.003) 0.18 (0.002) 0.16 (0.007) 0.17 (0.005) 0.08 (0.004) 0.07 (0.003) 
Professional 0.22 (0.003) 0.26 (0.003) 0.18 (0.007) 0.23 (0.006) 0.09 (0.004) 0.09 (0.003) 
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Services 0.08 (0.002) 0.10 (0.002) 0.10 (0.006) 0.12 (0.004) 0.21 (0.006) 0.25 (0.005) 
Sales 0.09 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) 0.12 (0.006) 0.12 (0.004) 0.12 (0.005) 0.11 (0.003) 
Office and Administrative    
Support 0.15 (0.003) 0.15 (0.002) 0.20 (0.007) 0.18 (0.005) 0.11 (0.005) 0.11 (0.003) 
Blue Collar 0.26 (0.003) 0.22 (0.002) 0.23 (0.008) 0.18 (0.005) 0.38 (0.007) 0.36 (0.005) 
Natural Resources,  
Construction &  
Maintenance -   0.09 (0.002) -   0.08 (0.004) -   0.19 (0.004) 
Production,  
Transportation &  
Material Moving -   0.13 (0.002) -   0.10 (0.004) -   0.17 (0.004) 
Firm size                         
Less than 10 employees 0.05 (0.002) 0.06 (0.001) 0.18 (0.007) 0.17 (0.005) 0.26 (0.006) 0.26 (0.005) 
10 to 24 employees 0.06 (0.002) 0.07 (0.001) 0.13 (0.006) 0.12 (0.005) 0.16 (0.005) 0.17 (0.004) 
25 to 99 employees 0.13 (0.002) 0.13 (0.002) 0.15 (0.007) 0.16 (0.005) 0.16 (0.005) 0.17 (0.004) 
100 to 99 employees 0.25 (0.003) 0.24 (0.002) 0.21 (0.008) 0.21 (0.005) 0.18 (0.006) 0.16 (0.004) 
1,000 or more employees 0.49 (0.004) 0.51 (0.003) 0.33 (0.009) 0.34 (0.006) 0.23 (0.006) 0.24 (0.005) 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. Estimates are weighted using the ASEC supplemental probability 
weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored 
insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. IPI = Individually-purchased insurance. Full-time work is defined by working 35 
or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year.  
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Table 4.3. Summary statistics for PTPY sample by ESI status 
                          
  ESI PH ESI Dependent Non-ESI 
  1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 
  N=3,212 N=4,158 N=4,734 N=6,885 N=5,455 N=8,075 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Annual Earnings 17,512 (386) 21,761 (467) 8,083 (162) 9,901 (179) 7,992 (408) 9,509 (258) 
Any Insurance 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 0.33 (0.007) 0.31 (0.006) 
ESI PH 1.00 - 1.00 - -   -   -   -   
ESI Dependent -   -   1.00 - 1.00 - -   -   
IPI -   -   -   -   0.13 (0.005) 0.12 (0.004) 
Public -   -   -   -   0.20 (0.006) 0.19 (0.005) 
Age 37.09 (0.255) 39.83 (0.260) 30.02 (0.203) 31.58 (0.205) 29.97 (0.173) 31.65 (0.167) 
Female 0.67 (0.009) 0.66 (0.009) 0.71 (0.008) 0.69 (0.007) 0.58 (0.008) 0.58 (0.007) 
Marital Status                         
Currently Married 0.54 (0.010) 0.50 (0.009) 0.53 (0.008) 0.52 (0.007) 0.28 (0.007) 0.27 (0.006) 
Previously Married 0.14 (0.007) 0.16 (0.007) 0.00 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.17 (0.006) 0.15 (0.005) 
Never Married 0.32 (0.009) 0.35 (0.009) 0.46 (0.008) 0.47 (0.007) 0.55 (0.008) 0.58 (0.006) 
Household Size 2.89 (0.030) 2.67 (0.026) 3.87 (0.020) 3.77 (0.018) 3.11 (0.030) 2.96 (0.023) 
Race                         
White 0.86 (0.007) 0.82 (0.007) 0.90 (0.005) 0.88 (0.005) 0.78 (0.007) 0.76 (0.006) 
Black 0.10 (0.006) 0.11 (0.006) 0.06 (0.004) 0.06 (0.004) 0.17 (0.006) 0.15 (0.005) 
Other/Multiple Race 0.05 (0.004) 0.07 (0.004) 0.04 (0.003) 0.06 (0.003) 0.05 (0.003) 0.08 (0.003) 
Hispanic 0.09 (0.005) 0.10 (0.005) 0.06 (0.003) 0.08 (0.003) 0.19 (0.006) 0.23 (0.005) 
Switched Jobs 0.20 (0.008) 0.16 (0.007) 0.22 (0.007) 0.15 (0.005) 0.25 (0.007) 0.20 (0.005) 
Union 0.24 (0.011) 0.18 (0.009) 0.19 (0.007) 0.13 (0.006) 0.17 (0.006) 0.12 (0.005) 
Years of Potential Experience 4.38 (0.223) 4.97 (0.225) 1.64 (0.097) 2.21 (0.121) 2.16 (0.115) 2.74 (0.122) 
Education                         
Less than HS 0.11 (0.006) 0.07 (0.004) 0.23 (0.007) 0.18 (0.005) 0.30 (0.007) 0.24 (0.005) 
HS Diploma/GED 0.29 (0.009) 0.24 (0.008) 0.25 (0.007) 0.21 (0.006) 0.31 (0.007) 0.31 (0.006) 
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Some College 0.23 (0.008) 0.21 (0.008) 0.30 (0.008) 0.31 (0.007) 0.24 (0.007) 0.26 (0.006) 
Associate's Degree 0.08 (0.005) 0.11 (0.006) 0.06 (0.004) 0.08 (0.004) 0.05 (0.003) 0.06 (0.003) 
Bachelor's Degree 0.21 (0.008) 0.25 (0.008) 0.12 (0.005) 0.16 (0.005) 0.08 (0.004) 0.11 (0.004) 
Graduate Degree 0.09 (0.006) 0.13 (0.006) 0.04 (0.003) 0.06 (0.003) 0.02 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 
Industry                         
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and  
Hunting, and Mining 0.02 (0.003) 0.01 (0.002) 0.03 (0.003) 0.01 (0.001) 0.05 (0.003) 0.02 (0.002) 
Construction 0.06 (0.005) 0.05 (0.004) 0.03 (0.003) 0.03 (0.003) 0.06 (0.004) 0.09 (0.004) 
Manufacturing 0.11 (0.006) 0.07 (0.005) 0.06 (0.004) 0.03 (0.003) 0.10 (0.005) 0.06 (0.003) 
Wholesale Trade 0.02 (0.003) 0.02 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01 (0.002) 
Retail Trade 0.18 (0.008) 0.11 (0.006) 0.34 (0.008) 0.19 (0.006) 0.33 (0.007) 0.18 (0.005) 
Transportation and Warehousing,  
and Utilities 0.04 (0.004) 0.05 (0.004) 0.02 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.03 (0.003) 0.03 (0.002) 
Information 0.02 (0.003) 0.03 (0.003) 0.01 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) 0.01 (0.002) 
Finance and Insurance, and Real  
Estate and Rental and Leasing 0.05 (0.004) 0.06 (0.004) 0.05 (0.004) 0.04 (0.003) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 
Professional, Scientific, and  
Management, and Administrative,  
and Waste Management Services 0.07 (0.005) 0.09 (0.006) 0.07 (0.004) 0.08 (0.004) 0.09 (0.004) 0.11 (0.004) 
Educational Services, and Health  
Care and Social Assistance 0.34 (0.009) 0.38 (0.009) 0.25 (0.007) 0.28 (0.006) 0.16 (0.006) 0.17 (0.005) 
Arts, Entertainment, and  
Recreation, and Accommodation    
and Food Services 0.04 (0.004) 0.08 (0.005) 0.06 (0.004) 0.20 (0.006) 0.05 (0.003) 0.21 (0.005) 
Other Services, Except Public  
Administration 0.02 (0.003) 0.03 (0.003) 0.05 (0.004) 0.05 (0.003) 0.07 (0.004) 0.06 (0.003) 
Public Administration 0.03 (0.003) 0.03 (0.003) 0.02 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) 
Occupation                         
Management 0.09 (0.006) 0.09 (0.005) 0.06 (0.004) 0.05 (0.003) 0.04 (0.003) 0.04 (0.002) 
Professional 0.25 (0.009) 0.31 (0.009) 0.16 (0.006) 0.21 (0.006) 0.09 (0.004) 0.11 (0.004) 
Services 0.14 (0.007) 0.17 (0.007) 0.24 (0.007) 0.27 (0.006) 0.28 (0.007) 0.33 (0.006) 
Sales 0.11 (0.006) 0.10 (0.006) 0.19 (0.006) 0.17 (0.005) 0.16 (0.006) 0.16 (0.005) 
Office and Administrative Support 0.18 (0.008) 0.16 (0.007) 0.19 (0.006) 0.18 (0.006) 0.13 (0.005) 0.13 (0.004) 
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Blue Collar 0.22 (0.008) 0.17 (0.007) 0.17 (0.006) 0.12 (0.005) 0.30 (0.007) 0.24 (0.006) 
Natural Resources, Construction  
& Maintenance -   0.06 (0.005) -   0.04 (0.003) -   0.12 (0.004) 
Production, Transportation &  
Material Moving -   0.11 (0.006) -   0.07 (0.004) -   0.12 (0.004) 
Firm size                         
Less than 10 employees 0.10 (0.006) 0.10 (0.006) 0.20 (0.006) 0.18 (0.006) 0.24 (0.007) 0.23 (0.005) 
10 to 24 employees 0.08 (0.005) 0.08 (0.005) 0.13 (0.006) 0.13 (0.005) 0.14 (0.005) 0.13 (0.005) 
25 to 99 employees 0.13 (0.007) 0.11 (0.006) 0.13 (0.006) 0.13 (0.005) 0.15 (0.005) 0.13 (0.005) 
100 to 99 employees 0.22 (0.008) 0.21 (0.008) 0.19 (0.006) 0.18 (0.006) 0.15 (0.006) 0.16 (0.005) 
1,000 or more employees 0.47 (0.010) 0.50 (0.009) 0.34 (0.008) 0.38 (0.007) 0.31 (0.007) 0.34 (0.006) 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. Estimates are weighted using the ASEC supplemental probability 
weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored 
insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. IPI = Individually-purchased insurance. Full-time work is defined by working 35 
or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year.  
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Table 4.4. Summary statistics for the FULL sample by ESI status 
                          
  ESI PH ESI Dependent Non-ESI 
  1995 2007 1995 2007 1995 2007 
  N=27,253 N=45,270 N=8,367 N=14,420 N=11,752 N=19,923 
  Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE Mean SE 
Annual Earnings 35,872 (233) 42,314 (264) 16,712 (248) 23,398 (270) 15,323 (276) 18,300 (213) 
FTFY 0.88 (0.002) 0.91 (0.002) 0.43 (0.006) 0.53 (0.005) 0.54 (0.005) 0.60 (0.004) 
Any Insurance 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 0.26 (0.005) 0.26 (0.004) 
ESI PH 1.00 - 1.00 - -   -   -   -   
ESI Dependent -   -   1.00 - 1.00 - -   -   
IPI -   -   -   -   0.13 (0.004) 0.12 (0.003) 
Public -   -   -   -   0.13 (0.003) 0.14 (0.003) 
Age 38.57 (0.072) 41.34 (0.066) 33.38 (0.151) 36.79 (0.137) 32.23 (0.116) 34.19 (0.102) 
Female 0.50 (0.003) 0.48 (0.003) 0.68 (0.006) 0.65 (0.005) 0.50 (0.005) 0.48 (0.004) 
Marital Status                         
Currently Married 0.60 (0.003) 0.58 (0.003) 0.69 (0.006) 0.72 (0.004) 0.35 (0.005) 0.34 (0.004) 
Previously Married 0.16 (0.002) 0.17 (0.002) 0.00 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.18 (0.004) 0.16 (0.003) 
Never Married 0.24 (0.003) 0.26 (0.003) 0.30 (0.006) 0.27 (0.004) 0.47 (0.005) 0.49 (0.004) 
Household Size 2.83 (0.010) 2.70 (0.008) 3.70 (0.015) 3.57 (0.013) 3.04 (0.020) 2.93 (0.015) 
Race                         
White 0.85 (0.003) 0.81 (0.002) 0.89 (0.004) 0.86 (0.003) 0.78 (0.005) 0.77 (0.004) 
Black 0.11 (0.002) 0.12 (0.002) 0.07 (0.003) 0.07 (0.003) 0.16 (0.004) 0.15 (0.003) 
Other/Multiple Race 0.04 (0.001) 0.07 (0.001) 0.04 (0.002) 0.06 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) 
Hispanic 0.08 (0.002) 0.11 (0.002) 0.07 (0.003) 0.09 (0.003) 0.21 (0.004) 0.29 (0.004) 
Switched Jobs 0.12 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) 0.19 (0.005) 0.13 (0.003) 0.22 (0.004) 0.16 (0.003) 
Union 0.28 (0.004) 0.22 (0.003) 0.21 (0.006) 0.16 (0.004) 0.20 (0.005) 0.15 (0.003) 
Years of Potential Experience 3.13 (0.056) 3.72 (0.054) 1.96 (0.076) 2.90 (0.088) 2.46 (0.083) 2.95 (0.073) 
Education                         
Less than HS 0.08 (0.002) 0.05 (0.001) 0.17 (0.005) 0.11 (0.003) 0.27 (0.005) 0.24 (0.003) 
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HS Diploma/GED 0.31 (0.003) 0.27 (0.002) 0.30 (0.006) 0.26 (0.004) 0.34 (0.005) 0.35 (0.004) 
Some College 0.19 (0.003) 0.18 (0.002) 0.26 (0.005) 0.25 (0.004) 0.21 (0.004) 0.20 (0.003) 
Associate's Degree 0.09 (0.002) 0.10 (0.002) 0.08 (0.003) 0.10 (0.003) 0.06 (0.002) 0.07 (0.002) 
Bachelor's Degree 0.22 (0.003) 0.26 (0.002) 0.14 (0.004) 0.20 (0.004) 0.09 (0.003) 0.11 (0.003) 
Graduate Degree 0.11 (0.002) 0.14 (0.002) 0.05 (0.003) 0.09 (0.003) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.001) 
Industry                         
Agriculture, Forestry,  
Fishing and Hunting, and  
Mining 0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.002) 0.01 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002) 0.03 (0.001) 
Construction 0.04 (0.001) 0.05 (0.001) 0.04 (0.002) 0.05 (0.002) 0.08 (0.003) 0.12 (0.003) 
Manufacturing 0.21 (0.003) 0.14 (0.002) 0.09 (0.004) 0.07 (0.003) 0.12 (0.003) 0.08 (0.002) 
Wholesale Trade 0.04 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.03 (0.002) 0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.002) 0.02 (0.001) 
Retail Trade 0.12 (0.002) 0.10 (0.002) 0.27 (0.005) 0.15 (0.004) 0.28 (0.005) 0.15 (0.003) 
Transportation and  
Warehousing, and Utilities 0.06 (0.002) 0.06 (0.001) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) 
Information 0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 0.02 (0.001) 
Finance and Insurance,  
and Real Estate and  
Rental and Leasing 0.08 (0.002) 0.08 (0.002) 0.06 (0.003) 0.07 (0.003) 0.04 (0.002) 0.04 (0.002) 
Professional, Scientific,  
and Management, and  
Administrative, and Waste  
Management Services 0.07 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) 0.07 (0.003) 0.09 (0.003) 0.08 (0.003) 0.10 (0.003) 
Educational Services, and  
Health Care and Social  
Assistance 0.23 (0.003) 0.25 (0.002) 0.25 (0.005) 0.26 (0.004) 0.14 (0.004) 0.15 (0.003) 
Arts, Entertainment, and  
Recreation, and  
Accommodation and Food  
Services 0.02 (0.001) 0.05 (0.001) 0.04 (0.002) 0.13 (0.003) 0.04 (0.002) 0.17 (0.003) 
Other Services, Except  
Public Administration 0.02 (0.001) 0.03 (0.001) 0.05 (0.003) 0.05 (0.002) 0.07 (0.003) 0.07 (0.002) 
Public Administration 0.06 (0.002) 0.07 (0.001) 0.03 (0.002) 0.03 (0.002) 0.02 (0.001) 0.01 (0.001) 
Occupation                         
Management 0.18 (0.003) 0.17 (0.002) 0.10 (0.004) 0.11 (0.003) 0.06 (0.003) 0.06 (0.002) 
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Professional 0.23 (0.003) 0.27 (0.002) 0.17 (0.005) 0.22 (0.004) 0.09 (0.003) 0.10 (0.002) 
Services 0.09 (0.002) 0.11 (0.002) 0.18 (0.005) 0.19 (0.004) 0.24 (0.004) 0.28 (0.004) 
Sales 0.10 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002) 0.16 (0.004) 0.14 (0.003) 0.14 (0.004) 0.13 (0.003) 
Office and Administrative  
Support 0.15 (0.002) 0.15 (0.002) 0.19 (0.005) 0.18 (0.004) 0.12 (0.003) 0.12 (0.003) 
Blue Collar 0.26 (0.003) 0.21 (0.002) 0.19 (0.005) 0.15 (0.004) 0.34 (0.005) 0.31 (0.004) 
Natural Resources,  
Construction &  
Maintenance -   0.08 (0.002) -   0.06 (0.002) -   0.16 (0.003) 
Production,  
Transportation & Material  
Moving -   0.13 (0.002) -   0.09 (0.003) -   0.15 (0.003) 
Firm size                         
Less than 10 employees 0.06 (0.002) 0.06 (0.001) 0.19 (0.005) 0.17 (0.004) 0.25 (0.005) 0.25 (0.004) 
10 to 24 employees 0.07 (0.002) 0.07 (0.001) 0.13 (0.004) 0.13 (0.003) 0.15 (0.004) 0.15 (0.003) 
25 to 99 employees 0.13 (0.002) 0.13 (0.002) 0.14 (0.004) 0.15 (0.003) 0.16 (0.004) 0.16 (0.003) 
100 to 99 employees 0.25 (0.003) 0.24 (0.002) 0.20 (0.005) 0.19 (0.004) 0.17 (0.004) 0.16 (0.003) 
1,000 or more employees 0.49 (0.003) 0.50 (0.003) 0.33 (0.006) 0.36 (0.005) 0.27 (0.005) 0.28 (0.004) 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. Estimates are weighted using the ASEC supplemental probability 
weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored 
insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. IPI = Individually-purchased insurance. Full-time work is defined by working 35 
or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year.  
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Table 4.5. DD regression estimates by sample and referent group 
Panel A: Binary ESI 
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY-ESI FULL IPW EB 
ESI PH 0.219*** 0.182*** 0.558*** 0.525*** 0.588*** 0.263*** 0.266*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.018) (0.019) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) 
2007 0.111*** 0.124*** 0.216*** 0.173*** 0.229***   0.125***   0.133*** 
 (0.008) (0.011) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009) (0.008)    (0.010)    
ESI PH*2007 -0.015 -0.031** -0.020 0.015 -0.098*** -0.017 -0.027** 
 (0.010) (0.013) (0.023) (0.022) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
 
Panel B: Continuous Premiums 
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY-ESI FULL IPW EB 
Log Employer Prem. 0.051*** 0.030*** 0.071** 0.052 0.098*** - - 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.035) (0.036) (0.012)   
Log Employee Prem. -0.028*** -0.010 -0.003 0.014 -0.031** - - 
 (0.010) (0.012) (0.041) (0.042) (0.015)   
2007 0.108*** 0.117*** 0.215*** 0.172*** 0.226*** - - 
 (0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.017) (0.009)   
Log Employer 
Prem.*2007 
-0.017 -0.021* -0.078 -0.072 -0.035*** - - 
 (0.012) (0.011) (0.052) (0.053) (0.012)   
Log Employee 
Prem.*2007 
0.017 0.020 0.083 0.081 0.025* - - 
 (0.013) (0.013) (0.059) (0.061) (0.013)   
N 94,466 76,321 32,519 18,989 126,985 126,985 126,985 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are deflated to 1999 dollars. The full sample includes 126,985 
observations. The FTFY though FULL columns are weighted using the ASEC supplemental probability weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. 
PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored 
insurance dependent. Full-time work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. 
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Table 4.6. DDD regression estimates by sample and referent group 
Panel A: Binary ESI 
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY-ESI FULL 
ESI PH*2007 -0.002 -0.032* -0.038 0.002 -0.091*** 
 (0.013) (0.018) (0.051) (0.064) (0.014) 
ESI PH*Female -0.023* 0.031 -0.043 -0.041 0.066*** 
 (0.013) (0.019) (0.041) (0.056) (0.015) 
ESI PH*Female*2007 -0.025 0.010 0.027 0.019 -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.024) (0.064) (0.081) (0.020) 
 
Panel B: Continuous Premiums 
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY -ESI FULL 
Log Employer Prem.*2007 -0.020 -0.023 -0.065 -0.061 -0.035*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.091) (0.094) (0.013) 
Log Employee Prem.*2007 0.023 0.024 0.066 0.065 0.027* 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.106) (0.107) (0.014) 
Log Employer Prem.*Female 0.054*** 0.059*** -0.044 -0.032 0.074*** 
 (0.019) (0.019) (0.069) (0.069) (0.017) 
Log Employee Prem.*Female -0.067*** -0.064*** 0.048 0.036 -0.076*** 
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.081) (0.079) (0.019) 
Log Employer Prem.*Female*2007 0.009 0.013 -0.015 -0.019 0.002 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.112) (0.114) (0.020) 
Log Employee Prem.*Female*2007 -0.012 -0.013 0.016 0.018 -0.002 
 (0.023) (0.022) (0.130) (0.129) (0.024) 
N 94,466 76,321 32,519 18,989 126,985 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. The full sample includes 126,985 
observations. Estimates are weighted using the ASEC supplemental probability weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-
year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. Full-
time work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. 
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Figures 
Figure 4.1. Health insurance coverage, 1995–2012 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. 
= Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. IPI = Individually-purchased insurance. This figure presents trends in 
insurance coverage by type of coverage between 1995 and 2012. ESI PHs are on the left axis and all other insurance 
types follow the right axis. 
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Figure 4.2. Log earnings by sample definition 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = full-time, full year 
worker sample. FTFY-ESI = full-time, full year workers covered by employer-sponsored insurance. PTPY = part-
time or part-year workers. PTPY-ESI = part-time or part-year workers covered by employer-sponsored insurance. 
FULL = full sample. BLS = Bureau of Labor Statistics. This figure presents log annual average earnings between 
1995 and 2012 for the full sample and four subsamples based on work status. Full-time work is defined by working 
35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. Also included are median 
earnings for full-time employees from CPS data series LEU0252881500 to document that the author’s calculations 
of earnings are consistent with national estimates produced by the BLS. The FTFY series closely resembles the BLS 
FTFY median earnings series. 
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Figure 4.3. Log earnings across ESI policy holders and referent groups, by sample 
definition 
Panel A. FTFY sample 
 
Panel B. PTPY sample 
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Panel C. FULL sample 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = Full-time, full year 
worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored 
insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. Full-time work is defined by 
working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. This figure presents 
log premiums on the left axis and log annual earnings on the right axis. The series ranges from 1995 to 2012 and 
earnings are presented by health insurance status for the FTFY, PTPY, and FULL samples.  
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Figure 4.4. Log earnings change by percentile by sample, 1995 and 2007 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = Full-time, full year 
worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored 
insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. Full-time work is defined by 
working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. This figure presents 
changes in log annual earnings at each earnings percentile across 1995 and 2007. Earnings changes are grouped by 
the FTFY, PTPY and FULL samples.  
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Figure 4.5. Log earnings change by percentile by sample and referent group, 1995 and 2007 
Panel A. FTFY sample. 
 
Panel B. PTPY sample 
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Panel C. FULL sample 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = Full-time, full year 
worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored 
insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. Full-time work is defined by 
working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. This figure presents 
changes in log annual earnings at each earnings percentile across 1995 and 2007. Earnings changes are grouped by 
health insurance type for the FTFY, PTPY, and FULL samples.  
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Figure 4.6. DD quantile regression estimates using binary ESI, 1995 and 2007, preferred 
FTFY models 
Panel A. FTFY sample 
 
Panel B. FTFY-ESI sample 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = full-time, full year 
worker sample. FTFY-ESI = full-time, full year workers covered by employer-sponsored insurance. This figure 
plots quantile regression coefficients at .05 quantile increments. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals and 
the thick grey line represents the OLS DD coefficients.  
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Figure 4.7. DD quantile regression estimates using binary ESI, 1995 and 2007, PTPY 
sample 
Panel A. PTPY Sample 
 
Panel B. PTPY-ESI Sample 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. PT/PT = part-time or part 
year worker sample. PTPY-ESI = part-time or part year workers covered by employer-sponsored insurance. This 
figure plots quantile regression coefficients at .05 quantile increments. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence 
intervals and the thick grey line represents the OLS DD coefficients.  
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Figure 4.8. DD quantile regression estimates using binary ESI, 1995 and 2007, FULL and 
quasi-experimental weighted samples 
Panel A. FULL sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel B. FULL sample with IPW Panel C. FULL sample with EB weighting 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FULL = Full sample. IPW 
= inverse propensity weighting, EB = entropy balancing. This figure plots quantile regression coefficients at .05 
quantile increments. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals and the thick grey line represents the OLS DD 
coefficients.  
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Figure 4.9. DD quantile regression estimates using employer and employee premiums, 1995 
and 2007, preferred models 
Panel A. FTFY sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. FTFY-ESI sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = full-time, full year 
worker sample. FTFY-ESI = full-time, full year workers covered by employer-sponsored insurance. This figure 
plots quantile regression coefficients at .05 quantile increments. Dashed lines indicate 95% confidence intervals and 
the thick grey line represents the OLS DD coefficients.   
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Figure 4.10. DD quantile regression estimates using employer and employee premiums, 
1995 and 2007, non-preferred models 
Panel A. PTPY sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel B. PTPY-ESI sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Panel C. FULL sample 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. PT/PT = part-time or part 
year worker sample. PTPY-ESI = part-time or part year workers covered by employer-sponsored insurance. FULL = 
Full sample. This figure plots quantile regression coefficients at .05 quantile increments. Dashed lines indicate 95% 
confidence intervals and the thick grey line represents the OLS DD coefficients.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
The ACA represents an unprecedented change in the US health system and has greatly 
increased the insured rate to over 90% (French et al. 2016). Using novel and rigorous empirical 
strategies, the second and third chapters of my dissertation provide a valuable contribution on the 
benefits of premium tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies.  In Massachusetts, I found a large 
response on the margin for the tax credits. For the ACA, I document robust, positive effects on 
private coverage at the lowest eligibility threshold and weak evidence of effects at higher 
thresholds. Separating these effects from other important ACA policies, such as Medicaid 
expansion or the individual mandate, is vital to future efforts to modify and sustain the progress 
made by the ACA. 
The fourth chapter addresses a significant gap in the literature, examining how employer-
sponsored health insurance (ESI) affects the earnings distribution. I examine the role of sample 
selection and selection bias as an explanation for the inconsistent findings in the literature and 
show that the inclusion of part-time or part-year workers leads to estimates that vastly overstate 
the earnings penalty.  I also provide evidence consistent with cost-shifting from employers to 
employees. The use of quantile regression shows that cost-shifting due to compensating wage 
differentials occurs, but is also offset for higher earnings due to higher marginal tax rates. 
Together, my dissertation indicates that reducing reliance on ESI may have beneficial effects on 
earnings for low- and middle-income individuals and that health insurance tax credits provide an 
appealing, alternative coverage option. 
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Going forward, I am building on my dissertation in at least two ways. First, the ACA 
chapter focuses only on 2014 outcomes. I am examining planned changes beyond 2014, such as 
increases in the individual mandate penalty, and unplanned changes, such as insurer dynamics on 
the exchanges. Second, building on the fourth chapter, I plan to investigate the effects of the 
ACA on the earnings distribution and others measures of income that account for the tax 
implications of ESI.   
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APPENDIX 1: SUPPORTING MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 2 
Appendix Figure 1. Density estimates around the 300% FPL cutoff, Massachusetts 
 1999–2006 2007–2009 
  
Notes: FPL = federal poverty level. FPL is centered at 300%. The presented range is 150% FPL to 450% FPL. The 
histogram bins have a width of 5% FPL. An Epanechnikov kernel density is overlaid on each diagram. There is no 
visual evidence of bunching or income manipulation near 300% FPL. There are several spikes across the distribution 
in the pre- and post-reform periods. 
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Appendix Figure 2. Income distribution within 5% FPL bins, pre- and post-reform 
 
Pre 
 
Post 
 
 
Notes: FPL = federal poverty level. This figure presents box plots of the income distribution within 5% FPL bins. 
The average income fluctuates across 5% bins due to the change in the poverty cutoff. In the pre-period below 
300%, the average income rises to $50,000 and then falls several times, signifying an additional family member 
increase the poverty cutoff.  
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Appendix Figure 3. Permutation tests for the post-period 
Any HI 
 
 
IPI 
 
(continued) 
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ESI 
 
 
PHI 
 
Notes: ESI = employer-sponsored insurance; HI = health insurance; IPI = individually purchased insurance; PHI = 
public health insurance. Points represent the coefficient estimate for the treatment effect using different FPL cutoffs. 
Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals. The largest effect size should occur near the 300% FPL cutoff. This is 
only the case of the IPI panel. The PHI panel is quite noisy, showing large effects elsewhere.  
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APPENDIX 2: SUPPORTING MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 3 
Appendix Table 1. Regression discontinuity estimates at 138% FPL/100% FPL, 250% FPL, and 400% FPL for HI outcomes, 
2010–2012 
  Expansion States   Non-Expansion States 
138% FPL     100% FPL     
N=30,603 Any HI IPI ESI PHI N=20,877 Any HI IPI ESI PHI 
Non-
parametric 
0.024* 0.005 0.010 0.008 Non-
parametric 
-0.001 -0.010 -0.005 0.014 
(0.013) (0.006) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) 
Linear 0.022 0.005 0.007 0.010 Linear 0.007 -0.009 0.002 0.014 
(0.015) (0.007) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.008) (0.017) (0.011) 
250% FPL         250% FPL         
N=27,440         N=20,977         
Non-
parametric 
0.024** 0.008 0.020 -0.003 Non-
parametric 
0.026* 0.015** 0.011 -0.002 
(0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.005) (0.014) (0.008) (0.016) (0.007) 
Linear 0.014 0.006 0.012 -0.005 Linear 0.018 0.016* 0.006 -0.003 
(0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.016) (0.009) (0.018) (0.008) 
400% FPL         400% FPL         
N=22,449         N=15,872         
Non-
parametric 
0.009 -0.006 0.015 0.001 Non-
parametric 
-0.007 -0.011 -0.001 0.006 
(0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.005) (0.011) (0.008) (0.014) (0.006) 
Linear 0.008 -0.006 0.015 -0.001 Linear -0.001 -0.011 0.005 0.005 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.007) 
Notes: * p<0.10, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Twenty-eight states had expanded their Medicaid program by 2014. IPI = individually 
purchased private insurance. Observations within 70% on either side of the cutoff are included. Standard errors are in parentheses. Non-parametric RD is 
calculated using a triangle kernel. Standard errors are clustered on FPL. Each OLS model includes the cutoff indicator interacted with FPL. Models are weighted 
using the ASEC supplement probability weights. Covariates include age, gender, race, marital status, family size, education level, self-reported health status, 
MSA status, and state and year fixed effects. 
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Appendix Figure 4. Any HI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2010–2012 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights.  
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Appendix Figure 5. IPI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2010–2012 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Appendix Figure 6. ESI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2010–2012 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Appendix Figure 7. PHI coverage by 5% FPL bins in 2010-2012 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Data come from the IPUMS-CPS. Symbols represent the proportion covered in a 5% FPL bin. Vertical 
dashed lines represent the 138%/100%, 250% and 400% FPL cutoffs. Local linear trends are imposed between each 
cutoff. Estimates are weighted using ASEC supplement probability weights. 
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Appendix Figure 8. Permutation testing for different FPL cutoffs for the probability of 
having IPI in 2014, 38%-238% FPL 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Points represent the coefficient estimate for the treatment effect using different FPL cutoffs. Vertical bars are 
95% confidence intervals  
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Appendix Figure 9. Permutation testing for different FPL cutoffs for the probability of 
having IPI in 2014, 150%-350% FPL 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Points represent the coefficient estimate for the treatment effect using different FPL cutoffs. Vertical bars are 
95% confidence intervals 
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Appendix Figure 10. Permutation testing for different FPL cutoffs for the probability of 
having IPI in 2014, 300%-500% FPL 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Points represent the coefficient estimate for the treatment effect using different FPL cutoffs. Vertical bars are 
95% confidence intervals 
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Appendix Figure 11. Bandwidth testing for the 138%/100% FPL cutoff for the probability 
of having IPI in 2014 
Expansion States 
 
Non-Expansion States 
 
Notes: Points represent the coefficient estimate for the treatment effect using the bandwidth indicated on the x-axis. 
Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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APPENDIX 3: SUPPORTING MATERIAL FOR CHAPTER 4 
Appendix Table 2. Balance checks using inverse propensity score weighting 
  
Set #1: Balance to 1995 ESI 
PHs 
Set #2: Balance to ESI PHs in 
each year 
Set #3: Balance to 1995 ESI 
PHs independently 
  
1995 All 
else 
2007 
ESI PH 
2007 All 
Else 
1995 All 
else 
2007 
ESI PH 
2007 All 
Else 
1995 All 
else 
2007 
ESI PH 
2007 All 
Else 
FTFY 0.46 -0.47 0.33 -0.05 -0.13 -0.15 0.01 0.00 0.02 
Age 0.46 -0.21 0.28 -0.02 -0.25 -0.23 0.00 0.00 -0.04 
Female -0.12 0.09 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.05 -0.05 0.00 -0.01 
Marital Status                   
Currently Married 0.12 -0.05 0.11 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.05 -0.01 -0.07 
Previously Married 0.08 -0.08 0.11 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.03 
Never Married -0.19 0.12 -0.20 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.06 
Household Size -0.13 0.14 -0.13 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
Race                   
White -0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.16 0.16 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Black 0.04 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.07 -0.06 0.01 0.00 0.01 
Other/Multiple Race 0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.00 -0.15 -0.16 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 
Hispanic -0.06 0.13 -0.14 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Switched Jobs -0.18 0.13 -0.05 0.03 0.13 0.14 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 
Union -0.02 -0.05 0.12 0.00 0.13 0.14 0.01 -0.01 0.01 
Years of Potential Experience 0.11 -0.02 0.06 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.01 0.00 -0.03 
Education                   
Less than High School -0.28 0.24 -0.19 0.02 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High School Diploma/GED -0.08 0.05 -0.04 0.00 0.07 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.02 
Some College -0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Associate’s Degree 0.09 -0.05 0.03 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.22 -0.12 0.14 -0.02 -0.09 -0.10 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 
Graduate Degree 0.25 -0.12 0.16 -0.01 -0.10 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 
Industry                   
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting, 
and Mining -0.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 0.06 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Construction 0.00 0.05 -0.07 0.01 -0.05 -0.05 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Manufacturing 0.01 -0.08 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.01 0.01 
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Wholesale Trade -0.01 -0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
Retail Trade -0.29 0.17 -0.02 0.02 0.21 0.21 0.04 0.00 -0.02 
Transportation and Warehousing, and  
Utilities 0.08 -0.06 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
Information 0.07 -0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
Finance and Insurance, and Real Estate and  
Rental and Leasing 0.08 -0.05 0.05 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 
Professional, Scientific, and Management,  
and Administrative, and Waste  
Management Services 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.01 -0.10 -0.09 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Educational Services, and Health Care and  
Social Assistance 0.12 -0.03 0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 -0.06 -0.01 0.01 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, and  
Accommodation and Food Services 0.10 0.08 -0.27 -0.01 -0.27 -0.27 -0.04 0.00 0.01 
Other Services, Except Public  
Administration -0.08 0.10 -0.07 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Public Administration 0.13 -0.11 0.14 -0.01 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 
Occupation                   
Management 0.14 -0.12 0.15 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.04 
Professional 0.24 -0.12 0.15 -0.02 -0.10 -0.11 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
Services -0.13 0.15 -0.21 0.02 -0.07 -0.05 0.03 0.00 0.03 
Sales -0.12 0.07 -0.08 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.02 0.01 0.01 
Office and Administrative Support 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.00 0.01 
Blue Collar -0.10 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.10 0.05 0.00 0.01 
Firm size                   
Less than 10 employees -0.21 0.28 -0.18 0.07 0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
10 to 24 employees -0.13 0.13 -0.14 0.00 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.01 
25 to 99 employees -0.04 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 
100 to 99 employees 0.08 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.01 
1,000 or more employees 0.22 -0.21 0.19 -0.03 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.00 0.03 
Self-Reported Health Status                   
Excellent -0.06 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.06 -0.03 0.01 0.00 
Very Good 0.06 -0.03 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Good 0.00 0.04 -0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 
Fair -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 
Poor 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. The full sample includes 126,985 observations. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker 
sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance 
dependent. Full-time work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. 
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Appendix Table 3. Balance checks using entropy balance weighting 
                    
  
Set #1: Balance to 1995 ESI 
PHs 
Set #2: Balance to ESI PHs 
in each year 
Set #3: Balance to 1995 ESI 
PHs independently 
  
1995 
All else 
2007 
ESI PH 
2007 
All Else 
1995 
All else 
2007 
ESI PH 
2007 
All Else 
1995 
All else 
2007 
ESI PH 
2007 
All Else 
FTFY 0.00 -0.42 -0.08 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Age 0.00 -0.55 -0.27 0.00 -0.23 -0.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Female 0.00 0.28 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Marital Status                   
Currently Married 0.00 0.11 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Previously Married 0.00 -0.17 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Never Married 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Household Size 0.00 0.22 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Race                   
White 0.00 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Black 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 0.00 -0.07 -0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other/Multiple Race 0.00 -0.11 -0.13 0.00 -0.17 -0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Hispanic 0.00 0.16 -0.06 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Switched Jobs 0.00 0.24 0.10 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Union 0.00 -0.02 0.15 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Years of Potential Experience 0.00 -0.10 -0.08 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Education                   
Less than High School 0.00 0.30 0.06 0.00 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
High School Diploma/GED 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Some College 0.00 0.11 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Associate’s Degree 0.00 -0.05 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Bachelor’s Degree 0.00 -0.20 -0.07 0.00 -0.08 -0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Graduate Degree 0.00 -0.30 -0.10 0.00 -0.10 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Industry                   
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing and Hunting,  
and Mining 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Construction 0.00 0.04 -0.11 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Manufacturing 0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.00 0.17 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Wholesale Trade 0.00 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Retail Trade 0.00 0.27 0.14 0.00 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00 
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Transportation and Warehousing, and  
Utilities 0.00 -0.07 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Information 0.00 -0.12 -0.06 0.00 -0.05 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Finance and Insurance, and Real Estate and  
Rental and Leasing 0.00 -0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Professional, Scientific, and Management,  
and Administrative, and Waste  
Management Services 0.00 0.00 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Educational Services, and Health Care and  
Social Assistance 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation, and  
Accommodation and Food Services 0.00 -0.01 -0.20 0.00 -0.14 -0.14 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Other Services, Except Public  
Administration 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Public Administration 0.00 -0.18 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Occupation                   
Management 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Professional 0.00 -0.23 -0.05 0.00 -0.09 -0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Services 0.00 0.14 -0.04 0.00 -0.06 -0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Sales 0.00 0.15 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Office and Administrative Support 0.00 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Blue Collar 0.00 0.10 -0.02 0.00 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Firm size                   
Less than 10 employees 0.00 0.28 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
10 to 24 employees 0.00 0.23 -0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
25 to 99 employees 0.00 0.19 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
100 to 99 employees 0.00 0.06 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
1,000 or more employees 0.00 -0.38 -0.01 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Self-Reported Health Status                   
Excellent 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Very Good 0.00 -0.10 -0.05 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Good 0.00 0.02 -0.04 0.00 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Fair 0.00 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Poor 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. The full sample includes 126,985 observations. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker 
sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance 
dependent. Full-time work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. 
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Appendix Table 4. Earnings dispersion between 1995 and 2012 
                              
 FTFY  PTPY  FULL 
Year GINI 
log(p90) -
log(p10) 
log(p90) -
log(p50) 
log(p50) -
log(p10) 
 GINI 
log(p90) -
log(p10) 
log(p90) -
log(p50) 
log(p50) -
log(p10) 
 GINI 
log(p90) -
log(p10) 
log(p90) -
log(p50) 
log(p50) -
log(p10) 
1995 0.35 1.56 0.79 0.78  0.52 2.73 1.20 1.53  0.44 2.53 0.92 1.61 
1996 0.36 1.54 0.77 0.77  0.52 2.59 1.17 1.42  0.45 2.41 0.89 1.52 
1997 0.37 1.61 0.76 0.85  0.52 2.67 1.16 1.51  0.45 2.39 0.89 1.50 
1998 0.37 1.55 0.74 0.80  0.50 2.70 1.19 1.51  0.45 2.40 0.87 1.53 
1999 0.37 1.61 0.77 0.84  0.51 2.62 1.19 1.43  0.45 2.48 0.92 1.57 
2000 0.39 1.61 0.85 0.76  0.52 2.65 1.16 1.49  0.46 2.37 0.91 1.46 
2001 0.40 1.60 0.81 0.79  0.53 2.74 1.25 1.49  0.47 2.38 0.92 1.47 
2002 0.38 1.61 0.85 0.76  0.52 2.67 1.23 1.45  0.45 2.40 0.93 1.47 
2003 0.38 1.61 0.80 0.81  0.52 2.71 1.22 1.49  0.45 2.44 0.94 1.50 
2004 0.38 1.65 0.80 0.85  0.51 2.71 1.20 1.50  0.45 2.36 0.92 1.45 
2005 0.39 1.64 0.83 0.81  0.52 2.71 1.16 1.55  0.45 2.33 0.91 1.42 
2006 0.40 1.66 0.85 0.81  0.52 2.68 1.13 1.55  0.46 2.25 0.92 1.33 
2007 0.38 1.61 0.81 0.80  0.51 2.63 1.16 1.47  0.45 2.28 0.96 1.32 
2008 0.39 1.65 0.84 0.82  0.52 2.65 1.22 1.43  0.45 2.30 0.95 1.35 
2009 0.39 1.62 0.83 0.80  0.51 2.62 1.20 1.43  0.47 2.37 0.96 1.40 
2010 0.38 1.65 0.85 0.80  0.51 2.68 1.22 1.46  0.45 2.36 0.94 1.42 
2011 0.39 1.71 0.91 0.80  0.50 2.64 1.18 1.46  0.46 2.36 0.98 1.39 
2012 0.39 1.71 0.90 0.81  0.51 2.61 1.14 1.47  0.46 2.42 1.00 1.42 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-
year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. Full-time work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the 
prior year. This table shows the GINI coefficient and the log differences across the 90th, 50th and 10th percentiles for each sample. 
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Appendix Table 5. FULL sample DD regression estimates with an interaction with FTFY status 
 FTFY PTPY FULL FULL 
ESI PH 0.219*** 0.558*** 0.588*** 0.569*** 
 (0.009) (0.018) (0.012) (0.017) 
2007 0.111*** 0.216*** 0.229*** 0.205*** 
 (0.008) (0.013) (0.009) (0.013) 
FTFY    1.113*** 
    (0.012) 
ESI PH*2007 -0.015 -0.020 -0.098*** -0.022 
 (0.010) (0.023) (0.010) (0.021) 
FTFY*ESI PH    -0.345*** 
    (0.016) 
FTFY*2007    -0.090*** 
    (0.014) 
FTFY*ESI_PH*2007    0.007 
    (0.023) 
N 94,466 32,519 126,985 126,985 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are deflated to 1999 dollars. The full sample includes 126,985 
observations. The FTFY though FULL columns are weighted using the ASEC supplemental probability weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. 
PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored 
insurance dependent. Full-time work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. 
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Appendix Table 6. Regression estimates using binary ESI, 1995 and 2007 by sample and referent group 
Panel A – No Gender Differences 
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY -ESI FULL 
ESI PH 0.209*** 0.155*** 0.536*** 0.508*** 0.527*** 
 (0.007) (0.003) (0.009) (0.011) (0.009) 
N 662,112 536,124 231,630 138,167 893,742 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Panel B – Gender Differences  
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY -ESI FULL 
ESI PH 0.229*** 0.137*** 0.557*** 0.555*** 0.488*** 
 (0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.014) (0.008) 
ESI PH*Female -0.040*** 0.030*** -0.031 -0.065*** 0.072*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.019) (0.020) (0.007) 
Female -0.221*** -0.284*** -0.127*** -0.101*** -0.362*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
N 662,112 536,124 231,630 138,167 893,742 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are deflated to 1999 dollars. The full sample includes 893,742 
observations. Estimates are weighted using the ASEC supplemental probability weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-
year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. Full-
time work is defined by working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. 
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Appendix Table 7. Regression estimates using employer and employee premiums, 1995 and 2007, by sample and referent 
group 
Panel A – No Gender Differences 
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY -ESI FULL 
Log Employer Prem. 0.044*** 0.022*** 0.053*** 0.035*** 0.091*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.010) (0.013) (0.005) 
Log Employee Prem. -0.023*** -0.005 0.013 0.029* -0.033*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.012) (0.015) (0.006) 
N 662,112 536,124 231,630 138,167 893,742 
* p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01 
 
Panel B – Gender Differences 
DV: Log Annual Earnings FTFY FTFY-ESI PTPY PTPY -ESI FULL 
Log Employer Prem. -0.032*** -0.045*** 0.073*** 0.049** -0.026*** 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.021) (0.023) (0.009) 
Log Employer Prem.*Female 0.056*** 0.063*** 0.024 0.026 0.083*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) 
Log Employee Prem. 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.031* 0.060*** 0.013 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.017) (0.019) (0.009) 
Log Employee Prem.*Female -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.033* -0.039** -0.087*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.018) (0.019) (0.010) 
Female -0.220*** -0.277*** -0.126*** -0.103*** -0.361*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.004) 
N 662,112 536,124 231,630 138,167 893,742 
Notes: * p<.10, ** p<.05, *** p<.01. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. The full sample includes 893,742 observations. Estimates are weighted using the 
ASEC supplemental probability weights. FTFY = Full-time, full year worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI 
PH = Employer-sponsored insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. Full-time work is defined by working 35 or more 
hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. 
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Appendix Figure 12. Log earnings at each percentile by sample, 1995 and 2007 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = Full-time, full year 
worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. Full-time work is defined by 
working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. This figure presents 
the log annual earnings at each percentile in 1995 and 2007. The difference between solid lines (2007) and dashed 
lines (1995) within each group are plotted in Figure 4.4. 
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Appendix Figure 13. Log earnings at each percentile by sample and referent group, 1995 
and 2007 
Panel A. FTFY sample. 
 
Panel B. PTPY sample 
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Panel C. FULL sample 
 
Notes: Data come the Current Population Survey. Earnings are adjusted to 1999 dollars. FTFY = Full-time, full year 
worker sample. PTPY = Part-time or part-year worker sample. FULL = Full sample. ESI PH = Employer-sponsored 
insurance policy holder. ESI Dep. = Employer-sponsored insurance dependent. Full-time work is defined by 
working 35 or more hours per week. Full-year workers work at least 40 weeks in the prior year. This figure presents 
the log annual earnings at each percentile in 1995 and 2007. The difference between solid lines (2007) and dashed 
lines (1995) within each group are plotted in Figure 4.5. Earnings are grouped by health insurance type for the 
FTFY, PTPY, and FULL samples.  
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